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CHAPTER I
SWISS HISTORY AND NEUTRALITY: THE BASIS FOR NAZI
GERMANY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SWITZERLAND
The accession to power of the National Socialist 
Party in Germany represented a threat to Switzerland 
in two respects. Not only was the Nazi Fuehrer-Principle 
diametrically opposed to the Swiss concept of democracy, 
but more importantly the Reich's race principle extended 
beyond Germany's borders to all of Europe<> The Swiss 
viewed the latter principle as a particular threat, 
since Switzerland was historically and culturally 
related to the Reich, and the German-speaking Swiss 
accounted for seventy per cent of the state's total 
population.
The basis for the race principle had been laid 
down in 1920 in Article I of the Program of the German 
Workers’ Party, which read: "We demand the union of
all Germans in a Pan German State (gross Deutschland) 
in accordance with the right of all peoples to self- 
determination."^ Four years later, in Mein Kampf, Hitler 
further emphasized that the "Reich must embrace all
1Konrad Heiden, A History of National Socialism 
(N.Y., 1935)> 14-1*3 passim.
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2Germans«” Although the theoretical foundations for a 
Pan German state had evolved long before the Nazi acces­
sion, it was only after 1933 that the Reich was able to 
put this theory into practice.
To stress the importance of its views toward 
Germans abroad, the National Socialist Party developed 
the concept of the German folk-community (Volksgemein- 
schaft), to which all Germans, regardless of their place 
of residence, owed allegiance0 The basic principles 
of the folk-community were embodied in Vom Wesen der 
Yolksgemeinschaft, which stated:
Adolf Hitler has set his stamp on the world 
folk-communityo This word is to make completely 
clear to the members of our people that the indi­
vidual is nothing when not a member of the community 
of men of the same origin, same language, and same 
culture, ioe0 the folk-community. „ 0 o
The German folk-community includes not only 
all those who- are members of the NSDAP, it includes 
all who by origin, language, and culture belong to 
the folk-community and in accordance with the rigid 
laws of nature acknowledge their allegiance- to the 
German folk-community
The task of spreading the principles of the 
folk-community fell to the Foreign Organization of the 
NSDAP (Auslands Organisation or AO der NSDAP)„ This 
body, through propaganda and agitation, worked to make 
Germans living abroad, as well as foreign citizens of
^Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans„ R 0 Manheim 
(Boston, 1943), 39$o
% . S 0, State Dept., National Socialism: Basic
Principles, their Application by the Foreign Organization, 
iind the Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi Aims (Wash. ? 1940), 
I ’l l  /Hereafter cited as State Dept., National Socialism./
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German extraction, conscious of their kinship to the 
Third Reich and of the fact that they owed to it their 
sole allegianceo Citizenship in a foreign country held 
no meaning for members of the folk-community«, The Bremen 
Nachrichten. reiterated this fact stating:
The Tolksdeutscher living in foreign states 
must know--besides the natural obligations of the, 
German toward his host— that he must remain loyal 
to his nationality (Volkstum); it is to this he 
owes the highest values
Switzerland became a primary target for folk- 
community propaganda and agitation soon after Hitler 
became chancellor in. January 1933 <> Switzerland, accord­
ing to the .League for Germaftdom in Foreign Countries, 
was the home of. 2,$60,000 Germans*
Two characteristics of Swiss history were particu­
larly significant in the formation of Nazi Germany’s 
policy toward Switzerlando First of all, the origin and 
nature of the Swiss Confederation were German„ And 
second, neutrality had been the basic principle of Swit­
zerland’s relations with the rest of Europe since the 
sixteenth century.,
When Henry I united the Germanic peoples in a 
single empire in 919* most of present-day Switzerland
^Bremen Nachrichten, as quoted in State DeptOJ 
National Socialism, 73«
^State Depto, National Socialism, 421* The 
figure of 2,$60,000 is quoted from a Nazi source and 
represents the number of German-speaking Swiss. The 
total number of German nationals in Switzerland did 
not exceed a few hundred thousand*
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came under the control of the new empire0 Various members 
of the Swiss nobility, notably the counts of Zurich, 
enjoyed a close friendship with the Imperial House, and 
in return the Emperors often stayed in German Switzer­
land., Henry II held Imperial Diets in Zurich in 1004 
and 101$. By 1032 all of Switzerland was included in 
the Holy Roman Empire and was governed by the dukes of 
ZaehringenB Ultimately, in the thirteenth century the 
counts of Habsburg became imperial bailiffs of Switzer- 
. land o
With the decline of the Empire’s power in the 
thirteenth century it became necessary for the cantons 
to undertake measures for their own government and defense, 
previously the Crown’s most important activities„ In 
effect, the cantons became relatively free of imperial 
control and resented the subsequent attempts of the 
Habsburgsto extend their authority over Swiss terri­
tory „ In order to preserve their independence, the Swiss 
cantons turned to Emperor Frederick II, who realizing 
that he had neither the power to defend the cantons 
nor to force them into subservience, granted them charters 
as free communities within the Empire0 The people of 
Uri received their charter in 1231 and those of Schwyz 
in 1240 0 Through granting the charters Frederick hoped 
to retain for himself the free passage over the strategic
5
6Alpine passes„
The charters of 1231 and 1240 enabled Uri and 
Schwyz to accept imperial sovereignty rather than become 
personal possessions of the Habsburgs, who eventually 
would have inherited the communities0
When Rudolf of Habsburg was elected Holy Roman 
Emperor in 1273 > imperial and feudal overlordship over 
the Swiss cantons passed into his hands, and he began 
to increase his holdings in central Switzerland while 
exercising more actively his feudal rights in Uri and 
Schwyzo To prevent further loss of their liberty at 
the hands of the Habsburgs, Uri and Schwyz sought se­
curity through unity0 In 1291 they extended an invita­
tion to the leaders of Unterwalden, which had recently 
come under Habsburg rule, to meet with them and prepare 
a common plan of action0 The meeting of these three small 
forest cantons resulted in creation of the "Perpetual 
League" for common defense, which is considered the actual 
beginning of Swiss political development0 For the next
two centuries, Swiss history was dominated by an increase
7in cantons bound together by similar alliances„
During this period the League proved its
^George A 0 Codding Jrc, The Federal Government 
of Switzerland (Boston, 1961), 210
^Lucerne joined the alliance in 1332; Zurich 
in 1351; Glarus and Zug in 1352; Berne in 1353; Fribourg 
and Solothurn in 14&1; Basel and Schaffhausen in 1501; 
Appenzell in 1513°
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effectiveness on a number of occasions0 In 1315, the 
three original cantons defeated. Duke Leopold at Morgarten, 
after he had attempted to reimpose his family’s authority 
on Schwyz and Unterwalden.o Following the victory at 
Morgarten the cantons adopted the name Swiss Confedera­
tion o As a confederation of eight members, the Swiss 
defeated the invading Austrians again in 13$6 at Sempach 
and in 13$$ at Jaefels, permanently ending Habsburg 
attempts to extend their authority over the Confedera- 
tion<>
By 1499? two additional members had joined the 
Confederation, and the Swiss finally threw off the yoke 
of the Empire after defeating the forces of Emperor 
Maximilian I in the 1499 Swabian War* By the terms of 
the Peace of Basel, September 22, 1499, the Swiss were 
freed from imperial obligations, although official recog- 
nition of the Confederation’s independent status was with­
held until.the 164$ Peace of Westphalia0
Initially, the three forest cantons had consti­
tuted a nucleus around which gathered all those districts
between the Jura, Rhine and Alps opposed to Habsburg 
Arule0 At this time the members of the Confederation 
were without exception German-speaking0
Until 1515, when Francis I of France defeated 
the Swiss at Marignano, Switzerland had enjoyed two
%illi am Oechsli, History of Switzerland, 1499- 
1914 (N„Yo, 1922), 2o /Hereafter cited as Oechsli, History 
of Switzerlando7
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centuries of military, success,, The French .victory put 
an end to the Swiss legend of invincibility and marked 
the beginning of Switzerland’s withdrawal from European 
affairso FollowingMarignano, the Swiss as allies of 
France shared in the defeats at La Bicocca in 1522 and 
Pavia in 1525. Thereafter the Swiss were content to 
refrain.from further warlike expeditions and began to 
turn to neutrality as the basic principle of their for­
eign .policy,,
The concept of Swiss neutrality is not completely
covered by the doctrines of international law* It must
be understood as a unique political entity which has
grown with the state,.has changed through centuries of
growth and has thus become an essential factor in the
9historical individuality of the Swiss State„ Initially, 
armed neutrality became the nation’s fixed policy, and 
foreign powers became accustomed to regard this policy 
as firmly established0 It was not until 1674 that the 
Diet of the Confederation declared perpetual and absolute 
neutrality to.be the principle of its foreign policy„
The decision to rely upon neutrality was the result 
of both internal and external causes„ While. Swiss troops 
had enjoyed considerable military success during the 
previous centuries, the individual cantons were not always
9Walter Hofer, Neutrality as the Principle of 
Swiss Foreign Policy (Zurich, 195777 67~~2,Hereafter cited 
as Hofer, Neutrality,/
g
at peace. Dissention between the small agrarian cantons 
and the strong urban cantons over economic policies 
caused unrest. At other times, the foreign policies of 
the individual cantons conflicted, causing additional 
problems. Finally, the immediate effect of the Reformation 
was to strain the already weak ties of the Confederation.
By far, the most important external cause for Switzer­
land’s declaration of neutrality was the rise of the 
Balance of Power in Europe. Switzerland actually lived 
on the jealousy and rivalry of its great neighbors.
In essence, the.equilibrium of rival great powers is the 
air in which the neutrality of small states thrives,
while the greatest threat to their existence is the
11ascendancy of. a single power. For this reason Swit­
zerland, with Great Britain, was the most consistent 
advocate of the Balance of Power in Europe throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Throughout these centuries, foreign powers re­
garded Switzerland mainly.as a field for procuring mer­
cenaries, and the Swiss concluded capitulation agreements 
with most European powers. In 17&7, it was calculated 
that the number of capitulated Swiss soldiers (serving 
with cantonal approval and in accordance with treaties)
•^Hofer, Neutrality, S.
-^Edward Bonjour, Swiss Neutrality: Its History
and Meaning (London, 194$ K  18. /Hereafter cited as 
Bonjour, Swiss Neutrality./
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in foreign service was 3^?000o^  However, while Swiss 
soldiers were found all over Europe, the Swiss people 
were turning away from the mercenary profession,, Con- 
sequently, in the course of the eighteenth century Swit­
zerland became one of the worst armed countries in Europe 
At the same time, the other powers were beginning to 
rely upon their own national armies, and the recruiting 
of mercenaries gradually died out, removing the last 
contingency which might involve the nation in a European 
disputeo
The armies of Revolutionary France presented the 
first major threat to Swiss neutrality.since the Thirty 
Tears’ War, during which both camps of belligerents 
attempted to enlist the Swiss on their side0 Following 
the French declaration of war on Austria on April 20,
1792, the Swiss Diet ordered the fortification of the 
frontier near Basel and declared its customary neutrality, 
including Geneva, Neuchatel and the bishopric of Basel 
in the declaration„ French respect for neutrality de­
creased in proportion to the success of its armies, and 
in 1797 the regions of Naltelline, Chiavenna and Bormia 
were separated from Switzerland and added to the Cisal­
pine Republic„ The rest of Switzerland was renamed the 
Helvetic Republic, charged with a heavy indemnity and
120echsli, History of Switzerland, 237.
13Ibido
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permanently allied to France,, Five years later Napoleon 
intervened to settle domestic strife in the Republic and 
forced the Act of Mediation upon the Swiss. The Act 
transformed the Republic into the Swiss Confederation, 
which became a French satellite, and not until Napoleon’s 
defeat did the Swiss regain their independence.
On March 20, 1S15, the Five Great Powers signed 
a joint declaration recognizing the perpetual neutrality 
of Switzerland as ”corresponding to the true interests 
of all European S t a t e s T h e  November Act of Neutrality, 
as the joint declaration became known, provided the founda- 
tion for Swiss neutrality throughout the nineteenth century 
and marked the incorporation of Swiss neutrality in inter­
national law. Although the Swiss welcomed the international 
guarantee of their neutrality, they were not content to rely 
solely upon its effectiveness. The Confederation saw in the 
maintenance of its own military forces the strongest guar­
antee of its neutrality. Thus perpetual and armed neutrality 
became the basis for Switzerland’s policy„
On the eve of World War I, Switzerland announced 
its intention to remain neutral in a declaration to the 
powers which reads
. . o the Federal Council formally declares that 
during the war which is about to begin, the Swiss 
Confederation will maintain and defend with all the 
means it has at its disposal, the integrity and the
HHofer, Neutrality, 11-12.
11
inviolability of the Swiss territory, as they have 
been recognized by the Treaties of 1815
Throughout the war Switzerland successfully fol­
lowed, the. course which had been proclaimed in August, 
although the Swiss, did find themselves drawn into the 
anti-German blockade, which was a violation of the prin­
ciple of neutrality,, In general however , Switzerland 
attempted to maintain equal trade with both camps of
belligerents for as long as possible„
Following the war, the signatories of the Treaty 
of Versailles recognized in Article 435 that n8 e. 0 the 
guarantees stipulated in favor of Switzerland by the 
Treaties of 1815 and especially the Act of November 20,
1815 constitute international obligations for the main- 
tenance of peace,O00n The traditional concept of 
rehirality which the Swiss had practiced for centuries ; 
was re-emphasized and its incorporation in international 
law verifiedo
The term neutrality implied that Switzerland would 
maintain a policy of impartiality in its foreign relations. 
However, the Council of the League of Nations was anxious 
to secure Swiss adherence to the League, an organization 
based upon collective security. But accession to the
^D,H, Miller„ The Drafting of the Covenant (N.I., 
1928) I9 429» /Hereafter cited as Miller, Drafting of the
"1 zlAllied and Associated Powers, The Treaties of 
Peace, 1919-1923 (N.T., 1924), I, 257»
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League and absolute neutrality were policies which excluded 
each other* Collective security implied confederation, 
partiality, intervention, whereas neutrality implied 
aloofness, impartiality and abstention* Therefore, the 
two principles could neither in theory nor in practice 
exist together*"^ A means had to be found to reconcile 
the two opposites *
The Swiss delegation to Paris also heartily 
approved of the creation of the League of Nations, since 
‘ such an organization, if successful, would be an asset 
to Swiss neutrality and independence* Therefore, Swit­
zerland was anxious not only to join the League, but 
also to see the League situated in Geneva where all 
members would be aware of Switzerland’s special position*
On February 14? 1919» the Swiss delegation at 
Paris issued,a "Memorandum Concerning Swiss Neutrality," 
an authoritative statement on Swiss neutrality, in which 
Switzerland’s devotion to the principle of neutrality 
for the past centuries was reviewed* The first portion 
examined the value of Swiss neutrality to Europe, especially 
in time of war* It stated in part:
Switzerland must remain in the future, as she 
has in the past, the trusty guardian of the passes 
of the Alps*
In this war, like already in 1S71, Switzerland
■^HoJ* Morgenthau, "The End of Switzerland’s 
’Differential’ Neutrality," American Journal of Inter­
national Law XXII (193$) > 559"! 2^erea^t-er cited as 
Morgenthau, "Differential Neutrality,£7
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could render humanity far greater services than she 
could have done in taking part in the struggle * * 0 <, 
An island of peace in the midst of the storm* Switzer* 
land could provide for the hospitalization and re­
patriation of victims of the war* * „ * Finally* 
the Swiss Confederation was enabled by its neutrality 
to contribute to fill the gap which had been left 
through the rupture of diplomatic relations between 
belligerents*
The second portion of the Memorandum laid the 
basis for Switzerland’s policy in the future in relation 
to the.establishment of the League * It stated s
if Switzerland will remain true to.her 
traditions 'and principles * she will occupy 'in the 
League* for the benefit of all confederate states* 
the place which is assigned to her by neutrality*19
Basically* Switzerland sought to reconcile the
idea of collective security with the concepts of neutrality
and inviolability of Swiss territory* In a subsequent
memorandum of general comments on the Draft of February 14*
1919* the Swiss delegation further discussed the value
of Swiss neutrality to the League in time of war*
If Switzerland was to sacrifice her neutrality 
in a war which is waged against an illegitimate war* 
her neutrality would scarcely be respected in all 
ordinary cases of war* Switzerland believes* 0 * 0 
that o o * she could render greater service by her 
neutrality than in taking an active part in a cam­
paign * * o o
It is understood that neutrality could not be 
interpreted as allowing any sort0of assistance to 
be given to States in conflict*
In an attempt to join the League with at least a 
iSMiller* Drafting of the Covenant 9 I* 429=31 passim, 
l9Ibidos 43I*
20Ibido, 302-304,
14
portion of its neutrality preserved, the Swiss Confedera­
tion introduced on April 11* 1919, an amendment to Article 
16 of the Covenant„ Had the amendment been accepted, it 
would have changed the Article to read s
The Members of the League agree that 0 „ „ on the 
request of the Council they will take necessary steps 
to afford passage through their territory to the 
forces of any of the Members of the League which 
are co-operating to protect the Covenant, of the 
League, 1
The Swiss amendment was rejected, however0 Presi­
dent Wilson, with the support of the French delegation 
opposed the measure0 The opponents argued that the 
obligation of the League to guarantee Swiss neutrality 
was inconsistent with the Covenant„ The Swiss, on the 
other hand, were determined to be allowed to object to 
free passage of troops over their territory and made 
further attempts to obtain some sort of declaration to 
replace the amendment„ It was suggested that President 
Wilson might refer to Swiss neutrality as being under 
Article 21 of the Covenant, the "Monroe Doctrine Article„” 
Wilson, however, made no reference to Swiss neutrality 
as being included in Article 21 in his April 28 speech 
to the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference„ Conse­
quently, the delegates ignored Switzerland’s position 
when the final draft was completed,, No loophole was left
21Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, I, J+280
through which Switzerland might enter the League with 
its neutrality intact,
Article 20 stipulated "that this Covenant is
accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings
inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof 0 0 
22o But Article 21 seemed to offer the possibility
of inclusion, in the League and maintenance of neutrality,, 
The "Monroe Doctrine Article" read:
Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to 
affect the validity of international agreements, 
such as treaties of arbitration or regional under­
standings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing 
the maintenance of peace,"^3
The Swiss Federal Council considered Swiss neutral 
ity to be precisely an "international agreement for 
securing.the maintenance of peace," Article 435 of the 
Versailles Treaty, as previously mentioned, did in fact 
recognize the. 1^15 Treaties guaranteeing...Swiss neutrality 
as "international obligations for the maintenance of 
peace,"2^ On the basis of the "Monroe Doctrine Article" 
and Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles, Switzerland 
sought to enter the. League without making reservations. 
Accordingly, the Swiss Federal Council sent.a note to 
all Powers represented on the Council, requesting a 
definition of Switzerland ?s status as a member,
22Miller, Drafting of the Covenant„ I, 690-91,
23Ibido, II, 691,
2^Allied and Associated Powers, The Treaties of 
Peace „ 1919=1923 (N,Yo, 1924), I, 257,
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The outcome of the Swiss request was the London 
Declaration of February 13 , 1920 which found Swiss neutral­
ity compatible with the Covenant.« The. League members 
recognized that ”Switzerland is in a unique situations,
based on a tradition of several centuries which had been
2 5explicitly incorporated in the Law of Nations0n ' The
treaties of 1615 and Article 435 were found to coincide
with Switzerland’s position on neutrality0 Switzerland
for its part recognized the duties of solidarity which
League membership imposed, including;
o o o the duty therein of co-operating in such eco­
nomic and financial measures as may be demanded by 
the League against a covenant-breaking State, and 
is prepared to make every sacrifice to defend her 
own territory under every circumstance, even during 
operations undertaken by the League of Nations, but 
will not be obliged to take part in any military 
action or to allow the passage of foreign troops 
or the preparations of military operations within 
her territory„
As a consequence of the London Declaration, 
Switzerland adopted a policy of differential, or partial 
neutrality, which provided a means to maintain the status 
of neutrality within a system of collective security
Ironically, when the proposal for Swiss membership 
in the League was presented to the Swiss electorate for 
approval by referendum, the measure passed by a majority 
of only 415,^19 to 323 ,225.0 Eleven and a half cantons
^League of Nations, Official Journal (March,
1920), 57-56o
26Ibid0
^Morgenthau, ?,Differential Neutrality,” 559»
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were carried for the League, ten and a half against ito
A change in ninety-four votes in Appenzell Exterior would
2 Bhave tied the state vote and defeated the League0 
Differential neutrality remained the basis for Swiss for­
eign policy for only eighteen years0 - By 1 9 3 Switzer­
land’s discontent with the failures of the League, coupled 
with pressure from Germany , caused the Federal Council 
to rescind differential neutrality in favor of returning 
to its traditional..policy of absolute neutralitjo
In. 1933 ?• Nazi Germany could view Switzerland , 
on the. basis of its origin., language and culture, as a 
member.of the German.folk-community„ Switzerland’s 
origin had indeed been. German, and the.country had been 
historically tied to Germany— directly and indirectly—  
for over a thousand years. Of the twenty-five cantons, 
nineteen were predominantly German, and.seventy-two 
percent of the population of 4,000,000 spoke German0^^
Nazi references to Switzerland as the "Suedmark” were 
not entirely unfounded*
By 1933» Swiss neutrality had been .an established 
tradition for over 400 years, while its incorporation 
in international law dated from 1S15* Following World
2 $EoCo Brooks, "Swiss Referendum on the League 
of Nations," American Political Science Review, XIV 
(August, 1920), 477“SOo
29coEo Black and E0C0 Helmreich, Twentieth Century 
Europe (N.Y*, 1963), 329«
IS
War. .Is, the desire, to be included in the League had led 
the Swiss government to drift away from the nation's 
established tradition of absolute neutrality,, As of 
February 2 0 9 1920,. differential neutrality replaced abso­
lute neutrality as the principle of Swiss, foreign policy,, 
and Switzerland implicitly drifted into the orbit of the 
victors of 191$o The Weimar Republic accepted and gen­
erally favored Switzerland's entry into the League, while 
German nationalist elements desired to see the proposal 
vetoedo Relations between the two countries were not 
strained until Hitler came to power, after which differ­
ential neutrality and Swiss membership in the League 
were continually attacked 0
CHAPTER II
GERMANY’S ATTITUDE TOWARD SWISS NEUTRALITY, 1933-1940
German foreign policy during the Nazi era was com­
plicated by the State-Party dualism resulting from the 
influence of the National .Socialist Party in the German 
Foreign Office.,, In effect, the Foreign Organization of 
the NSDAP"*' competed with the Foreign Office in the direc­
tion of policy and, in general, hindered the work of the 
lattero Initially under the direction of pre-Nazi diplomats, 
the Foreign.Office aimed at inducing Switzerland to return 
to its traditional policy of perpetual, absolute neutrality 
which had been compromised when the Swiss joined the League 
of Nationso The success of this policy required that 
nothing be done by Germany which would prejudice German- 
Swiss relationso On the contrary, the Foreign Office 
intended to assure Switzerland that Nazi Germany constituted
•**The first Party organization concerned with the 
problems of Germans abroad was formed in 1930 in Hamburg,,
In 1933» the organization came under the direction of Ernst 
Bohle, a protege of Hitler’s Deputy, Rudolf Hess„ Two years 
later, Foreign Office officials were inducted into the 
Foreign Organization as a professional group, insuring 
collaboration of diplomats abroad with Party agents„ The 
Foreign Organization received definitive sanction in 1937 
when it was designated as the Foreign Organization in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs„ Although Bohle was placed 
under the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Ministry exercised 
only a very general control over his work.
19
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a threat neither to Swiss neutrality nor independences, 
hoping that the Swiss would sever their ties with the 
League once it was clear that Germany had no designs on 
Switzerland0
On the other hand, in 1933 the Foreign Organiza­
tion began to put into practice the theory of the German 
"folk-community,” which.aimed at uniting all Germans in 
a "greater Germany,” based upon self-determination <> Un­
like the Foreign Office which operated through diplomatic 
channels, the Foreign Organization appealed directly to 
the Swiss people through the press, propaganda and politi­
cal agitation, emphasizing vociferously that the Swiss, 
because of their long historical association with Germany, 
were destined to be incorporated in Hitler?s Reich0 Con­
sequently, the Swiss were impressed with the fact that 
the new German regime represented a potential threat to 
their independence®
According to the German Minister to Berne, Swit= 
zerland had viewed the Versailles Treaty as unwise if 
not unjust, but preferred maintenance of the status quo 
to a new w a r 0 The realization in 1933 that Germany had 
not reconciled itself to defeat came as a shock to the 
Swisso Suddenly they saw Nazi Germany as capable of 
anything--marehing on France through Switzerland, over­
whelming Austria, and possibly annexing Switzerland's
German-speaking cantons„ Simultaneously, Switzerland 
began to awaken from the misconception that the League 
had secured permanent peace» The Swiss still considered 
the League to be better than nothing, for it at least 
provided a speaking platform for the smaller countries 
and served as a court of appeals0 For these reasons Swit­
zerland continued to support the League and tried to per­
suade Germany to co-operate again„
In 1933 > the Swiss government, although concerned
about German designs on Switzerland, adopted an entirely cor-
3rect attitude toward Nazi Germany,> Initially, the press and 
public opinion followed the lead of the government, but both 
quickly became critical of developments to the north0
Recalling that the Swiss had experienced a similar 
reaction to Italian Fascism, Germany adopted a philosophi­
cal attitude toward Switzerland0 It was assumed that the 
Swiss would eventually become accustomed to National 
Socialism and possibly accept the doctrine themselves„
In contrast to the majority of the Swiss who op­
posed National Socialism, the reaction among some right­
ist circles was positive0 In addition to the pro-Nazi 
parties already in existence, three new parties, the 
Association of National Socialist Confederates, the Con­
federate Front, and the Movement for National Revival
2U0So, State Depto Documents on German Foreign Policy 
191S-1945 s /Hereafter cited,~as^ l ^ 7 ~rrTrilasho , 19497, 771
3Ibido, I, 6$20
were formed„ While pursuing different individual aims, 
the three organizations jointly professed a belief in the 
ideology of National Socialism,, The Association of 
National Socialist Confederates, most extreme of the groups 
sought incorporation of Switzerland in the "fatherland” 
and hailed Hitler as their "liberatoro"^ Although the 
membership of such organizations remained very small, 
Germany interpreted their formation as a significant 
gain for the Reicho
The German Legation in Berne, headed by Adolf
5 6Mueller and Ernst von Weizsaeker, his successor, began
a systematic study of the Swiss mentality and attitude,
the results of which were to be used as a basis for Germany
future policy toward Switzerland, Mueller observed that
the Swiss desire for freedom had undergone no change
since the Middle Ages and that the Swiss still retained
the desire for undisturbed freedom. In a memorandum to
the Foreign Office, he recommended that Germany issue an
^'GoEoWo Johnson, "Switzerland is Next,” North 
American Review, CCXXXVII (1934), 524-25o 
cited as Johnson, "Switzerland is Nexto^/
^Adolf Mueller had held the post in Berne since 
World War I„ Although he was a Social Democrat, he was 
allowed to remain at Berne for more than six months after 
the accession of the Nazi Party <>
^Ernst von Weizsaeker (1SB2-1951), entered the 
diplomatic service of the Weimar Republic in 1920, serving 
as Minister to Norway, 1931-1933<> Under Hitler he held 
the following posts: 1933-1936, Minister to Switzerland;
1936-1933, Head of the Political Department in the Foreign 
Ministry; 193&-1943, State Secretary; 1943-1945, Ambassador 
to the Holy SeeG
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official statement of respect for Swiss neutrality0 In 
regard to Nazi propaganda in Switzerland, he observed:
For the propagandistic treatment of Switzerland 
and particularly for the German section, it is my 
experience, that great reserve and unobtrusiveness 
are necessary0 0 o 0
Abrupt advice and long-winded polemics would only 
provoke more resistance, whereas with a calm attitude 
by us the correcting will occur in the country by 
itself0 For indeed the basic mood in German Switzer- 
land is entirely German, and the furor Helveticus 
awakens only when misgivings are aroused concerning 
infringement of Swiss independence0?
From the beginning, the Foreign Organization 
branches in Switzerland had an adverse effect on the Swiss„ 
Their overzealous agitation most often met with opposition 
More importantly, however, very few Swiss were attracted 
by Nazi Germanyfs emphasis on race and the possible inclu­
sion of Switzerland in Hitler’s "greater Germanyo" The 
Confederation would not have survived long, had its three 
national elements— German, French and Italian-emphasized 
their own superiority and tried to subdue the others <> The 
result would have been the dissolution of the state and its 
partition by Switzerland’s powerful neighbors0 It was, in 
fact, the de-emphasis of German, French and Italian nation­
alism that had enabled Switzerland to continue its existence0 
Hence, no Swiss, particularly the German Swiss, were inter­
ested in seeing Nazi racism gain a foothold, in Switzerland„
The immediate effect of the propaganda directed 
toward Switzerland was to cause concern among Swiss leaders
7DGFP, G, I, 6S2-S3 o
24
over the country's ability to defend its neutrality and
gindependenceo. The Head of the Swiss Military Department,
9Federal Councillor Minger, in a speech on July 9, 1933
asked for a considerable increase in the nation's military
budgeto He justified the increase on the belief that in
a future war there would be a race between the belligerent
neighboring countries to gain control of strategically
10located Switzerland0 Since Switzerland alone would never 
be a match for the French or German forces , the Swiss 
planned to detain any invading force at the frontier un­
til the other neighbor came to its assistance0 Thus Swit­
zerland would automatically become the ally of France should 
Germany attack Switzerland0 On the other hand, the Swiss 
would ostensibly ally themselves with Germany in the event 
of a French violation of the Swiss frontiero
The approval of Minger’s request by the Federal 
Council was in Germany’s political and military interest0 
Maintenance of Swiss neutrality by a sufficiently strong 
and adequately armed force provided a flank protection 
exceedingly desirable to Germany in case of military
£>A characteristic example of Nazi propaganda was 
a declaration in which Germany declared itself ready to 
’’free the 2 ,■000,000 Germans living under the Swiss yokeo” 
Quoted from the New York Times, Augo 29 §> 1933? 1°
^Rudolf Minger (1&&1-1955); Chief of the Swiss 
Military Department, 1933-1945; elected President of the 
Swiss Confederation in 1929o
10DGFP9 C, I, 6S0o
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11conflicts between Germany and France„ The possibility 
of a French preventive war against Germany could not be 
dismissed, in the early period of the Reich, particularly 
in view of Germany’s attitude toward the Versailles Treaty,, 
In such a circumstance, Switzerland’s ability to defend its 
territory and prevent a French march through the country 
into southern Germany was unquestionably an asset to Ger­
many o
In July 1933, Mueller received notice from a ”west-
ern source of information that had been reliable for many
years,” that the French General Staff had made definite
plans for reoccupation of the Rhineland in the event of
12German rearmament„ Taking this information into account, 
he recommended that Germany observe the greatest circum­
spection in its treatment of Switzerland, compelling propa­
ganda in Switzerland to be as inconspicuous as possible„ 
Mueller undoubtedly hoped to use the alleged threat of 
French intervention to curb Nazi propaganda and its adverse 
effect on the Swisso As usual his recommendations were 
ignored, and the Foreign Organization continued its agi­
tation o
A month later, Mueller analyzed the political 
atmosphere in Switzerland as still favorable to Germany,
11DGFP, C0 I, 6S0o
12Ibido, 6Slo
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but noted that the Nazi organizations, in understandable
zeal for publicizing their ideology, were making too much
noiseo He further cautioned that any sort of cooperation
with the leadership of the Swiss pro-Nazi fronts would be
13detrimental to German-Swiss relations0 By August, it 
was already obvious to many observers that Nazi propaganda 
was not having the desired effect, for a decline in Nazism 
in Switzerland was discernableo Now there were meetings 
at which large crowds declared their attachment to Swiss 
democratic ideals and to the Swiss army0 On the other 
handj meetings of the Swiss ’’grey shirts/’ the local Nazi 
sympathizers, were still numerous and well-attended, but 
failed to raise the same interest or attract the same 
audiences as before<> The decline in  Nazism can be attri­
buted to psychological errors in Nazi propaganda which 
resulted in a patriotic revival among the Swiss
Such propaganda did have one positiye effect;, 
since it prompted the Swiss to accelerate rearmament for 
defense of their neutrality0 On October 12, 1933 > the
Federal Assembly voted to appropriate 20,000,000 Swiss
15francs to replenish arms and military equipment0 In
the course of the debate on the defense bill, Minger stated
13DGFPs C, I, 664-65 *
14New York Times, 0cto 12, 1933, 1.
33Ibido„ Augo 299 1933? 1°
27
that a German plan|for the invasion of Switzerland existed,
explaining that it was the type of plan that all general
staffs drafted, bat what was disquieting about it was the
small importance attached to the Swiss army and its power 
16of resistanceo Minger did not mention his source for the
alleged invasion, and Germany denied the existence of
such a plan<> Whether true or not, Minger?s statement, when
coupled with the threats inherent in Nazi propaganda,
17had the desired effect on the Assembly,, With the ini­
tiation of a program for modernization of its armed forces, 
Switzerland took the first steps toward implementing a 
policy of active, or armed neutrality, and declared itself 
ready to resist any aggression by force of arms0
Swiss public opinion, as well as the opinion of 
government leaders, had turned strongly against Germany 
in the months prior to the debate on the rearmament billo 
Further, a series of violations of the Swiss frontier by
■̂ The. .appropriation of 20,000,000 francs was only 
the first portion of a 120,000,000 franc request,, Since 
192$ when only 750,000 francs were expended on defense, 
the military budget had steadily increased,, By 1937 de­
fense appropriations had reached 235»000,000 francs 
($£0 ,000,000),,
17It was in the interest of France to play upon 
the Swiss fear, of a German invasion, and the French press 
frequently carried reports of such German plans» The 
"Auger" Articles, written by "Auger/' Vladimir Poliakov, 
and carried by Le Petit. Parisien on September 24 and Octo­
ber 8 reported that a German invasion of Switzerland was 
imminent„ The "Auger" Articles were introduced into the 
debate to arouse and intensify the fear of Germany which 
was prevalent among some Swiss officials0
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Nazi agents increased Swiss hostility toward Germanyo A
violation at O.tterbach was under investigation in late
September .1933, after Switzerland had protested the viola-
tionQ Weizsaeker assured Federal Councillor Motta that
if the Germans concerned were guilty they would be punished„
A month earlier, the Swiss Minister to Berlin had protested
a violation of the frontier near Ramsen where German police
officers reportedly arrested a Czech citizen and dragged
19him bodily across the frontier into Germany0 Party
functionaries carried on their activities among Germans in 
Switzerland by attacking old German societies and individual 
Germans, and generally distinguishing themselves by their 
presumptiono To come into conflict with Swiss authorities 
was a proof of courage for them0 Anyone who was deported
from Switzerland could expect to be rewarded on his arrival
. P 20 m  Germany„
Germanyfs banning of three Swiss newspapers, the 
Neue Zuercher Zeltung, the Zuercher Volkzeitung a and the 
Basler Nachrichten added to.the hostile feeling in Switzer­
land 0 The Swiss government, as well as the German Foreign
1^DGFP, C, I, 843-44° Giuseppe Motta (1870-1940). 
Chief of the Swiss Political Department (Foreign Ministry), 
1920-1940; President of the Swiss Confederation, 1915? 1920, 
1932 and 19370
~̂% e w  York Times, Aug0 29, 1933 ,
^Ernst von Weizsaeker, The Memoirs of Ernst von 
Weizsaeker (London, 1951), 90o '/Hereiafter cited as Weiz- 
saeker, Memoirs 77
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Office, were anxious to dispel Swiss fears and restore 
friendly relations.,. Foreign Minister Motta, hoping to 
secure an official German declaration of respect for Swiss 
neutrality, used the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 
September as an opportunity to explain Switzerland’s posi­
tion to the German delegateso Germany, too, was concerned 
about the anti-German feeling in Switzerland, particularly 
since Swiss rearmament appeared to be directed solely
against Germany0 Meeting with the German Foreign Minis-
21ter, Konstantin von Neurath, .and the Minister of Propa-
22ganda, Joseph Goebbels, he emphasized the anxiety that 
reigned in..Switzerland regarding alleged Nazi ambitions 
in Switzerlando. The German Ministers categorically told 
Motta that, such fears were absurd0 In Germany, "no rea­
sonable person thought of. endangering the existence of the
23Swiss Confederation0" Neurath explained that Germany 
was not in a position to make an official declaration of 
respect for Swiss neutrality since a declaration of respect
^Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath (1B73-1956), 
served as German Ambassador to London prior to his accep­
tance of the Foreign Ministry in von Papen’s "Cabinet of 
Barons" in 1932„ In 193$ Hitler retired him in favor of 
Joachim von Ribbentrop0 As a reward for his service, 
Neurath was appointed President of the newly created Cabi­
net Council, a body which was to advise the Fuehrer on 
foreign affairs, but never met0
09Drc. Joseph Goebbels (1S97~1945)? Reich Minister 
of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, 1933“1945o
23DGFP, C, I, $43“440
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for Swiss neutrality would have made similar declarations 
to all neutrals necessary„ Consequently, no official 
steps were taken by either government to calm the situa­
tion, although Motta was encouraged by Neurathvs state­
ment o
By the end of 1933? Germany’s policy in Switzerland 
had had very limited success„ The pro-Nazi fronts had 
lost some of their initial supporters, while the Swiss 
had experienced a patriotic revival and were becoming 
increasingly anti-German0 Nazi propaganda was alienating 
the Swiss rather than converting them0 Weizsaeker noted 
that, for the time being, the over-all balance in Switzer­
land was negative, and he re-emphasized the fact that the
2LSwiss were not impressed with the usual Nazi propaganda.,
Any German success in Switzerland would be prevented as 
long as the Swiss feared loss of their independence to 
Germanyo
On January 30, 1934? Hitler himself increased the 
anxiety in Switzerland, when in a speech to the Reichstag, 
he stated s
„ „ o it is self-evident that an aggressive intent 
which has gripped and stirred to its depths the 
whole German nation will not halt at the frontier 
posts of a land which is German, not only in its 
people, but in history as well, and which for many 
centuries was an integral part of the German Empire0
24DGFP9 C , n ,  774o
^5Johnson, "Switzerland is Next," $27-2So
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Hitler was referring specifically to Austria, but the
Swiss were fully aware that Switzerland fell into the
same categoryo Nazi propaganda had emphasized the fact
during; ..the past year0
In the same months, a Swiss fugitive from justice,
Erich Maey, was given command of a Berlin Storm Troop
detachment composed of Swiss citizens living in Germany
who declared themselves dedicated "to clean up the Swiss
pig sty0" In response, the Swiss press intensified its
attacks on National Socialism and German officials,. Finally,
on March 27, 1934, the. Swiss Federal Council passed an
ordinance which authorized the..-government to ban Swiss papers
27if their attitude disturbed relations with a foreign powero 
The ban, however, was not enforced„ To ban a Swiss paper 
would have made the banning of German papers a necessity, 
a step which the government hoped to avoid0
The Reich resorted to a pre-censorship of Swiss 
papers in order to force the Swiss press to moderate its 
comments , on Germany„ From time to time,, the Basler Naeh- 
richten was confiscated and the National-Zeitung subjected 
to a pre-censorship by the Gestapo0 German authorities 
failed to announce the reasons for the bans and confisca­
tions, and consequently .their action seemed to be arbitrary
Johnson, "Switzerland is Next," 529°
27DGFP, C, II, 872o
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and haphazard acts of police authority0 An attack on the 
Swiss press by Per Angriff, a semi-official paper edited 
by Go.eb.bels, brought a strong reaction from the Swiss0 
Public opinion gradually forced the government to adopt 
reprisalso On July 6, Switzerland banned Per Angriff, 
the Berliner Boersen-Zeitung» and the Voelkischer Beobachter 
as counter measures to the discrimination against Swiss 
papers in Germany» Two days later, Germany retaliated by 
banning the Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Per Bund, and the Basler 
National-Zeitungo With the reciprocal bans in effect, the 
press war subsided for the next five months0
In the meantime, debate on Swiss rearmament proceeded0 
Germany observed with appreciation the continued rearma­
ment of the Swiss military, whose determination to defend 
Swiss neutrality met with popular approval of all Swiss 
partieso Even the Social Bemocrats set aside their paci­
fist line to -support Minger fs defense billo Tentative 
plans called for lengthening the term of military service, 
construction of frontier fortifications, and expansibn of 
the air force. Even with these measures, Switzerland could 
not reach a strength that would enable the state to defend 
its frontiers without the help of a third party„
Swiss defensive plans were made regardless of which 
frontier appeared to be threatened at the moment„ Army 
maneuvers were not directed at any one side, and the forti­
fications were to be constructed in small numbers and
33
spread over all exposed parts of the frontier,, In 1934, 
the Swiss gave proof of their intention to remain neutral 
and defend their territorial integrity during the crisis 
in Austria,,
When civil war erupted between the supporters of
Chancellor Dollfuss and the Austrian Socialists, the question
of foreign intervention arose„ Such a possibility was
dispelled on February 21, when the Federal Council announced
29that Switzerland refused transit to any foreign troops0 
In July, a Putsch carried out by Austrian Nazis led to the 
assassination of Dollfuss„ In this instance, Swiss neutral” 
ity proved to be an asset to Germany since the possibility 
of intervention was raised in France„ Switzerland discour­
aged active intervention by refusing to allow any foreign 
military force pass through Switzerland,, In November 1934 
Weizsaeker noted:
Thus, far the Swiss concept of neutrality is quite 
clearo „ „ „ It also fits completely with Germany5s 
interestso As matters stand today, we can not wish 
for anything better on our southern frontier between 
La-ke Constance and Basel than a firm buttress and a 
guarantee against surprises„3Q
Although Switzerland would ostensibly defend its 
frontiers against any aggressor, including France, Geirmany 
was well aware that the Swiss had departed from neutrality
2SDGFP, C, III, 144o
29Ibida, 5&U 
3°Ibido, $72-73 o
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as far as their sympathies were concerned„ Obviously, with
this condition prevalent, Switzerland would be likely to
place the blame on Germany should a European crisis develop»
Germanyfs task in Switzerland was to modify the condition
by adapting its propaganda to win over Swiss sympathy0
By December 1934 the Swiss press had toned down
its anti-German attitude0 With the bans on the papers due
to expire on January 10, 1935, three days before the Saar
plebescite, the Foreign Ministry and the German Legation
in Berne suggested that the bans not be renewed, since it
was hoped that the plebescite would be favorably reported
in the Swiss press„ Hitler, however, ’’doubted the wisdom”
of lifting the bans, since Switzerland had not completely
31abandoned its attacks on National Socialism,,
On January 1, 1935, Motta®s Deputy approached 
Bernhard von Buelow3^ on the subject of an official German 
declaration of respect for Swiss neutrality» Buelow re­
plied that it would be difficult to find any authoritative 
quarter in Germany which would be prepared to make such a 
statemento "They would not run the risk of making them­
selves look ridiculous, as no serious person in Germany
was thinking of interfering.with the integrity of Switzer-
33land in any way0” On the following day, Buelow again 
31DGFP, C, III, 732o
3^B@rnhard von Buelow (1&&5-1939), State Secretary 
in the German Foreign Ministry„
33DGFP, C, III, £90-91o'
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rejected a similar request, pointing out that such a dec­
laration. to Switzerland would be followed by requests, by 
other countries, "so that Germany should eventually be in 
the awkward and ridiculous position of having to give 
assurances to all sides that we are not robbers at heart 
and were not lying, in wait for our neighbors0" For the 
time being Germany saw no reason to issue a declaration 
of respect for Swiss neutrality.. As far as the foreign 
Ministry was concerned, there were no definite plans 
regarding Switzerland fs possible incorporation in the 
Reich., The Swiss state was more valuable to Germany as 
a neutral buffer against France on the southern frontier 
of the Reich0
In March, the tension in Switzerland was increased 
when German agents in.,_Kl@inbasel kidnapped Berthold Jacob, 
a German emigre, working against the Nazi regimeo German 
authorities refused to admit the fact and refused to re­
lease Jacob.* Swiss sovereignty had again ve.en violated, 
and Weizsaeker was left with the difficult task of exerting
a calming influence in Berne until he succeeded in over-
3 5coming the obstinancy of German official quarters* The 
Swiss government protested the incident vigorously and 
and invoked the German-Swiss Arbitration Treaty of 1921o
34d g f p , c , h i , £9Q“9i0
3 5Weizsaeker, Memoirs, 93°
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Forseeing the probable verdict of a court of arbitration, 
Weizsaeker finally convinced Berlin of the futility of 
holding Jacobo On September 9? Hitler ordered the victimJs 
release; he was handed over to Swiss authorities a week
ereignty, the Federal Council took up the question of 
dissolving all Kfazi organizations in Switzerland,, In 
an attempt to repair the damage done by the 11 Jacob case/' 
Hitler in a speech on May 21 emphasized Germany l!s intention 
to pursue a policy of peace and friendship with its neigh­
bors, stating tftat:
The German Reich— and in particular the present 
German Government— have no other wish than to live 
on friendly and peaceful terms with all neighboring 
Stateso We entertain these feelings not only toward 
‘ > but also toward the neighboring
The Fuehrer made special reference to the relations be­
tween the Reich and Switzerland;
I myself believe that no regime which does not 
rest on public consent and is not supported by the 
people can continue permanently,. If there are no 
such difficulties between Germany and Switzerland, 
which is to a large extent German, that is due to 
the fact that the independence and self-reliance of 
Switzerland is a reality, and because nobody doubts 
that the Swiss Government represents the real and
later
As a result of this last violation of Swiss sov-
^Adolf Hitler, My New Order„ ed„ de Sales (NoT„, 
1941), 322„ /Hereafter cited as Hitler, My New OrderT’
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37legal expression of the will of the people0
Foreign Minister.Motta was impressed by Hitler’s
"deep and sincere desire for peace which made itself felt
throughout the speech" and expressed his pleasure at the
recognition of the independence and autonomy of the Con- 
3 Bfederation,, For the present at least, Hitler was con­
tent to allow the Swiss Confederation to continue its 
independent existence on the Reich’s southern frontier,,
By assuring the Swiss of his respect for their independence, 
Hitler successfully calmed public opinion and prevented 
temporarily the dissolution of National Socialist groups 
in Switzerland0
The calming effect of the May 21 speech was short­
lived o Germany revived the press war by imposing a new 
ban on the Basler Nachrichten„ alleging that the paper 
had been publishing anti-German articles„ Switzerland 
retaliated by imposing bans on Per Relchsdeutsche, the 
organ of Germans in Switzerland, Per Stuermer and Per 
Alemanne o Berlin continually cited the anti-German Swiss 
as the basic cause.of trouble between the states0 Switzer­
land for its part hesitated to place any restrictions on 
its own presss particularly after it was banned throughout 
Germanyo
•^Hitler, My New Order, 326-2?o 
3^PGFP, C, III, 239“40o
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The Swiss Government honestly tried to maintain
its policy of neutrality but could do nothing to correct
the attitude of the public <, "The Swiss papers had every
right to be critical„ Their readers demanded that they
should express a definite point of view in regard to the
Third Eeicho In a sound democracy this could only be 
3 9negativeo Hitler and his advisers were not inclined to
take advice from abroad and reacted to it with frontier
incidents or other criminal aets0 The diplomatic reports
from Berne were not believed in Berlin, since local and
regional-representatives of the party in Switzerland rose
above the diplomatic personnel in importance0 As a whole,
these officials had been recruited from the ranks of those
who had been failures in their professions and who now thought
that their time had come„ "As in every revolution, the
social misfits, tub-thumpers, and informers came to the 
40surface0" The role of the German Minister to Switzer­
land was not a dynamic one; it was his function to act 
as a brake o4"*"
Swiss public opinion held that foreigners living 
in Switzerland had diplomatic and consular representatives 
for their protectiono Dual state controls, such as the
3 9Weizsaeker, Memoirs 9 96 c.
4°Ibidc„ 94o 
41Ibld c, 90o
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Nazi regime had established in Germany, could not be toler­
ated in Switzerland because the unofficial representatives 
of the party in power created only confusion and trouble„
In the fall of 1935» the Swiss left-wing press 
initiated a campaign to bring about the expulsion of Wil­
helm Gustloffthe Landesgruppenleiter^  of the Foreign 
Organization in Switzerland0 Gustloff had angered Swiss 
socialists by organizing Germans in Switzerland in support 
of Hitlero On February 4i> 1936, David Frankfurter, a 
Jugoslav medical student in Berne, assassinated Gustloff 
in his home in Davos0 The assassin declared to the can­
tonal police that he was a Jew and wished to avenge the 
persecution of Jews in Germany
Reaction in Germany created a sensation which 
crowded all other events into the background,, Hitler 
immediately sent the following telegram to Gustloff?s 
widow”
In the heavy loss you have suffered I express 
to you in the name of the whole German people my 
sincerest sympathy0 The nefarious crime that put 
an end to a truly German man has created deep
^The Landesgruppenleiter were the regional leaders 
of the Nazi Party organizations abroad„ Gustloff generally 
coordinated the activity of the Party in Switzerland„ To 
assist him, Gustloff relied upon Party leaders in each can­
ton, known as Kreisleiter0 Gustloff himself was a fanatic 
follower of Hitler, adoring the Fuehrer to the point of 
idolatryo According to Weizsaeker, he often gazed at the 
Fuehrer?s picture for hours "to gain strength,," Weizsae­
ker, Memoirs» 94°
^ New York Times, Feb„ 5j 1936, 1„
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emotion and resentment in the entire nation,,^
Morning papers in Germany carried the story in banner head- 
lineSo The Voelkischer Beobachter used the assassination 
for an attack on Judaism, stating that the assassination 
provided justification for National Socialism’s stand on
uthe Jewish question0
Weizsaeker called on Motta and demanded a strict
investigation of the. assassination„ He emphasized the
complicity of the Swiss press in inciting the assassin,
pointing out that he could not recall a conversation with
Motta in the past two years in which he did not have to
strongly protest the Swiss press0 The German Minister
explicitly stated that the press campaign had not only
represented the murdered man as the embodiment of National
Socialist disruption in Switzerland and had consistently
demanded his expulsion, but had also, at least covertly,
4bencouraged violence against him0 The Propaganda Minis­
try instructed the German press to emphasize the.point that 
Frankfurter did not commit an act of revenge, did not know 
the victim, and had arrived from Jugoslavia three years 
earlier from whence he had derived no motive for the acto^
44New York Times, Feb0 5$ 1936, lc 
45Ibido
46DGFP, C, IV, 1095o 
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The motivation for the crime had come from the Swiss press 
and Frankfurter? s exposure to the campaign against Gust­
loff o
The assassination provided Germany with a new mar­
tyr for National Socialism as well as an opportunity to 
exact concessions from the Swiss government in the form 
of restrictions on the Swiss press o German authorities 
continued to emphasize the complicity of the Swiss press 
as the sole cause of the crime, confident that the Federal 
Council would finally take steps to tone down the press <,
Unfortunately for Nazi propagandists, the forth­
coming Olympics which were to be held in Germany, made it 
necessary to avoid anti-Jewish excesses for a time* Ger­
many intended to present its more civilized side to the 
nations of the world, so the Frankfurter trial was not 
allowed to develop.'into a " Jewish Monster Trial." The 
Voelkischer Beobachter » most vitriolic of the German pa­
pers called for the death penalty for Frankfurter, but 
this too was a v o i d e d T h e  Swiss Constitution excluded 
the death penalty for political crimes, and the Canton of 
Grisons, in which the crime was committed, had abolished 
capital punishment, years before. Ultimately, Germany’s 
only policy was to press for restraint of the Swiss press, 
hoping to remove or at least moderate a major source of
^ N e w  York Times, Feb. 7 , 1936, 13o
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criticism.of the Third Reicho
Swiss reaction to the assassination came as a com­
plete surprise to Germany„ On February £, 1936, the Fed­
eral Council ordered the suppression of all cantonal 
(Kreisleitungen) and regional (Landesleitung) Nazi organi­
zations in Switzerlando
As usual, the Voelkischer Beobachter led the pro­
test and called for reciprocal action against Swiss citizens 
49in Germanyo Neurath immediately protested the ban , 
stressing that Switzerland had subjected the NSDAP. to an 
exceptional law which was not compatible with the general 
law relating to aliens and that the resolution plainly dis­
played an inner and direct connection with the murder of the
50Landesgruppenleiter„ Under these circumstances, the
German Government expected the Swiss to rescind the pro­
hibition of February Switzerland refused, and officially
all National Socialist organizations in Switzerland were- 
dissolved, leaving the Nazi Party without representation 
in Switzerland„ To compensate for the loss of the Landes- 
gruppenleiter, Germany transferred the work of that de­
partment to the Legation in Berne and appointed a new 
member to the Legation to carry on Gustloff9 s duties0
The assassination and its consequences made necessary
^% e w  York Times, Feb« 19> 1936, 13°
5°DGFP, C, IV, 1153=56, passim.
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a new evaluation of the position of Germans in Switzer­
land „ Weizsaeker noted that a very large number of Reichs- 
deutsche (German citizens in Switzerland) still displayed 
a temporizing or even negative attitude toward the Reich,, 
This did not imply that all previous propaganda had been 
in vain, but rather that rapid progress was not to be 
expected because of the Swiss fear of National Socialism0 
He reiterated his earlier program for successful work in 
Switzerland , which had been set forth in 1933° If the fear 
of Germany 's annexing a part of Switzerland were reduced, 
successful work among the German-speaking Swiss would 
increaseo ̂
Germany's denunciation of the Locarno Pact on
March 7, 1936 produced no major reaction among the Swiss0
Motta j with whom Weizsaeker discussed the. German plan for
reoccupation of the Rhineland, described the step as a
52’’dangerous gamble0n The Swiss Foreign Office viewed 
the situation calmly, showing understanding for Germany's 
positionj and on March. 10, affirmed that Switzerland was 
not obliged to take part in sanctions imposed on a viola­
tor of the Locarno Pact*. After the reoccupation of the 
Rhineland, Switzerland stepped up work on its national 
defenses,, Previously, Germany had erected new defensive
51DGFP, C, IV, 1195“96o 
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installations on its side of the Swiss frontiero In an 
interview with Defense Minister Minger, Weizsaeker praised 
the Swiss determination to defend its neutrality and dis­
counted a critical article in the Boersen-Zeitung as not 
taking exception to Swiss rearmament but only to its ap­
parent one-sidedness „ Minger pointed out that it was 
Switzerland’s duty to safeguard its frontier so as to make 
an advance into Switzerland not worth the risk for either 
France or Germanyo The new German installations in South 
Baden and in the Black.Forest had caused concern in Swit­
zerland o Weizsaeker discounted the rumor of alleged German
designs on Switzerland and assured Minger that Switzerland
54had nothing to fear from Germany0
Although Hitler had no designs on Switzerland while 
Weizsaeker served as Minister to Switzerland s an official 
declaration of respect for Swiss neutrality had become 
necessary• Certain party leaders had had a markedly dis­
turbing effect on German-Swiss relations„ Strong language 
by Goering^ such as "The Swiss have muck in their heads/' 
and threatening speeches directed across the Rhine by the 
Gauleiter of Baden? as well as the attitude of some South
55German newspapers 9 kept alive the Swiss fear of annexation,,
53DGFP, C s 6 8 7 o
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On January 30, 1937? Hitler, in a speech to the
Reichstag, referred to the German guarantees to Belgium
and Holland, renewing his pledge nfo recognize and guarantee
these States as untouchable and neutral regions for all 
56timeo” The Fuehrer made no mention whatsoever of Swit­
zerland o The omission caused immediate concern in Swit­
zerland where the people regarded Swiss neutrality as 
the model for all neutral states„ Hitler9s failure to 
guarantee Swiss neutrality led to a visit by ex-President
Schulthess to Berlin, where he was received by Hitler0
!
The Fuehrer expressed his belief that Switzerland was
a European necessity and that the Reich desired to have
the best relations with the Swiss<, In closing, Hitler
affirmed.; "Through all time and whatever happens, we
will respect Switzerland’s neutrality and integrity. I
affirm it categorically„ Never have I given occasion
57for a contrary opiniono" The Federal Council took note 
of the statement with satisfaction, hoping that the Reich 
would live up to the promise. Hitler’s declaration coin­
cided with a declaration by Mussolini that Italy had stopped 
all irredentist propaganda in Italian Switzerland follow­
ing Swiss recognition of his. Ethiopian conquest0
Hitler’s statement to Schulthess was the first
56Hitler, My New Order, 410.
57New York Times, Feb. 27, 1937,
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official attempt by Berlin to follow the policy advocated 
by the German Legation in Berne0 The statement succeeded 
in improving relations between the two states, but Nazi 
agitation and propaganda directed toward Switzerland did 
not stop, and the Swiss continued to display a strong 
anti-German attitude in their press0
Hitler apparently agreed with Weizsaekerfs belief 
that Swiss neutrality was in Germany?s interest since a 
neutral Switzerland provided a ’’firm buttress and guaran­
tee. against surprises” on the southern frontier of the 
Reich, On March 10, 1937, Hitler expressed his approval 
of Swiss neutrality to Weizsaeker, Switzerland in the 
south and Belgium in the north were to be pivots, and 
between them Hitler intended to fortify the frontier very 
strongly, ”That would. Hitler observed, ”be the best 
thing for us0”^
In November 1937, the pro-German circles in Swit­
zerland momentarily set aside their Pan-German agitation 
and resorted to legal means to secure their objectives. 
According to the Easier Nachrichten« the pro-Nazi circles 
hoped to place a proposal before the Swiss electorate 
which would repudiate the London Declaration of 1920 and
force the Swiss to readopt their traditional, prewar policy
59of absolute neutrality. Although unsuccessful, the 
5gWeizsaeker, Memoirs«, 113o 
5%few York Times, Nov, 11, 1937, 10„
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German attempt to use legal channels indicated a change
in Nazi policy <> An attempt had been made earlier to bring
the states closer together through a proposed conference
between representatives of the German and Swiss press0
However, the success of the conferences was blocked by a
speech at Nuremberg, in which the German press chiefs
Dr« Dietrich, attacked Swiss independence,, Switzerland
consequently shelved the proposed conference„
By February 1938? it was again necessary for Hitler
to reassure the Swiss that they were not an object of the
60Reich’s racial policy0 Hitler’s reassurance helped to 
mollify the hostile feeling created by Dietrich’s Nuremberg 
speech and calm the situation in Switzerland in prepara­
tion for Germany’s Anschluss with Austria0
On March 14 $ after the German army had moved into 
Austria, the German Minister to Berne called on Motta to 
assure him, in the name of Hitler, that Germany had no 
evil intentions in regard to Switzerland and that the 
Fuehrer would respect the integrity of the country*,^ A 
day earlier, the Swiss had reinforced customs guards along 
the Austrian frontier, explaining that the precautions taken 
were meant to deal with the possibility of an influx of
60DGFP, D,V, 674o
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refugeeso The Swiss government took a grave view of the 
Anschluss, partly because of Hitler’s methods and partly 
because of what these methods and Hitler’s program for 
unifying the whole German race implied for Switzerland,^
On March 15, Weizsaeker again stressed Hitler’s pledge 
to Switzerland in an attempt to counter the Swiss press 
which drew a lesson from Austria’s fate, The annexation 
of Austria led the Swiss army to speed up the completion 
of its defenses all along its borders with the Reich,
During the crisis, bridges across the Rhine and roads 
leading to the frontiers were mined, but this was the extent 
of Swiss action at the time.
In regard to the Anschluss, the Swiss Minister to 
Berlin, Hans Froelicher, expressed the opinion that 
Switzerland was naturally interested in having Austria 
remain a buffer between Germany and Italy, On the other 
hand, the internal stability of its neighbors was equally 
Important to Switzerland, and the Swiss were not blind 
to the fact that Austria was unable to bring about domestic 
conciliation on its own,^ The Swiss Government did not 
take a strong stand against Germany’s action in Austria, 
even though it implied a similar fate for the Swiss,
62New York Times, March 13, 1933, 3o 
63Hans Froelicher, Swiss Minister to Berlin* 1933-
1945 c
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After the Anschluss, Germany reopened its press 
campaign against Switzerland0 Vienna bookshops displayed 
maps of the new Reich including Austria and the territories 
outside the Reich?s frontiers considered to belong to the 
"fatherland <>" Among the territories were included the 
German-speaking portions of S w i t z e r l a n d T h e  Frank­
furter Zeitung published an article which stated; "No 
branch of the German race has the right of the possibility 
of withdrawing -from the common destiny of all the Germans 
In the same vein, the Deutsche Bergwekzeitung wrote that 
Austria had "had the experience called Verschweizern 
(Swissing), meaning the tragedy of a people which has been 
made to believe that they were a nation while in reality
6?they were only part of a community of the same language0" 
Both statements gave notice that Switzerland could not 
expect to continue its independent existence outside of 
the Reicho Ultimately the Swiss Government lodged a pro­
test in Berlin against the agitation which marked German­
speaking regions of Switzerland as future German territory0 
While the German press carried on its Pan-German 
demands, the German Minister in Berne pressured Foreign 
Minister Motta to exercise more control over the attitude
^R.Ao Friedman, "New Anschluss," 313<>
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of the Swiss press0 The Swiss Publishers 8 Association 
had already in January 193& cautioned the press to exer­
cise restraint in questions of foreign policy<> But no 
official pressure was exerted to restrain the press, and 
the Publishers’ Association’s cautioning was not taken 
seriously by many papers,,
Hitler’s success in Austria completed the destruc­
tion of Switzerland’s faith in the League of Nations and 
convinced the Swiss that their only hope of escaping in­
volvement in hostilities was to revert to the traditional 
policy of absolute neutrality„ On May 14* 193&* the League 
accepted the Swiss decision and agreed that Switzerland, 
while still remaining a member of the League, would not 
be called upon to join in the enforcement of economic 
sanctionso
Minister Denichert presented the new German For- 
eign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, with a note on 
Swiss neutrality informing him of Switzerland’s decision,, 
Ribbentrop expressed no enthusiasm for Switzerland’s re­
turn to absolute neutrality and referred to the "possible 
untoward consequences in wartime of Swiss hospitality 
to the L e a g u e H e  also criticized the still objectionable
6gJoachim von Ribbentrop (l$93-1947)* succeeded 
Neurath as Foreign Minister in 193 Previously he had 
served as Ambassador to London and with his "Bureau Rib­
bentrop" dabbled in Foreign Policy,,
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character of the Swiss p r e s s G e r m a n y  intended to with­
hold a declaration of respect for Switzerland’s new status 
until concessions were made concerning the anti-German 
Swiss press and the position of the Nazi organizations in 
Switzerland which had been banned in 1936c The Swiss 
retreat to absolute neutrality was a victory for German 
policy, but the problem of the League’s location in Geneva 
still remainedo
Not until June 14 did Hitler again express his 
determination to respect Swiss neutrality "in all circum­
stances promising that the policy would not be changed 
70in the future, Mussolini simultaneously notified the
Swiss government of Italy’s intention to respect Swiss
neutrality. The joint declarations, for which the Swiss
government expressed "very great satisfaction and gratitude/’
led to a brief period of improved relations between Germany
71and Switzerland, But as the autumn of 193$ approached, 
Germany began to intensify its press campaign against Swit­
zerland, However, the agitation in the Nazi press differed 
from the previous propaganda, Germany now made an effort 
to force Switzerland to adhere tightly to its policy of 
absolute neutrality. The Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte 
attempted to extend the concept of neutrality beyond the
69DGFP, C, V, 671,
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acts and pledges of the government to cover even the atti-
72tude of individuals and private institutions0' Switzer­
land was led to believe that if it did not follow this 
policy of neutrality Germany might disregard its assurances 
to Switzerlando
Militarily* Switzerland regained its importance 
as a buffer between France and southern Germany,, In the 
event that France attempted any intervention against the 
Reich, a neutral Switzerland prepared to defend its neu­
trality against the French would be a definite asset to 
the Reich, Germany relied heavily on the belief that France 
would respect Swiss neutrality, Therefore Hitler was rea­
sonably sure that French intervention, if any, would come 
somewhere along the French-German frontier, and necessary 
German forces could be concentrated in that area.
On September 13, 193$, the Swiss Government again
ordered mines placed under all bridges and tunnels near
73the frontiers as "preventive measures0n Two weeks later,
in order to further emphasize Its intention to maintain 
absolute neutrality, Switzerland addressed a note to Hitler 
resolving to remain outside any conflicts and not to engage 
in controversial questions, or even express an opinion on
7^Arnold Toynbee and Veronica Toynbee, Survey of 
International Affairs, 1939-1946; The War and the Neutrals 
(London, 1956), 205, /Hereafter cited as Toynbee", War and~ 
the Neutrals o7
73New York Times, Sept„-13, 193$, 14<>
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the procedure that might solve such questions
During the Munich crisis, Switzerland hesitated 
until the last moment to undertake measures for mobiliza­
tion and in the end avoided mobilization completely., The 
Swiss Government intended to maintain strict neutrality, 
although public opinion strongly protested the German 
action in Czechoslovakia„ During the crisis, life became 
strenuous for Germans in Switzerland„ Tradespeople were 
subject to a boycott, and numerous insults against Germans 
took placeo Germany considered similar measures against 
Swiss citizens in Germany but dropped the idea since counter 
measures would have increased the difficulties of Germans 
in Switzerlando The Swiss press carried its attack on the 
Munich settlement so far as to attack Daladier and Chamber- 
lain for their participation in the dismemberment of the 
Gzech state,,
Germany®s success at Munich caused Switzerland to 
revise its attitude toward France„ Some circles among the 
Swiss began to wonder about the effectiveness of the French 
military, particularly since Switzerland counted on French 
assistance in the event of a German attack on, or invasion 
through, Switzerlando
Swiss agitation against Germans reached its high 
point in November 193$° The Berne newspaper, Per Bund„
?^New York Times, Sept„ 30, 193$s 6„
published a letter, allegedly addressed by a German lawyer
to a client in Switzerland, referring to the ”future Reich
Governor of Berne0T,̂ 5 Demonstrations against Germans in
Berne followed, and the boycott against merchants continued„
Ultimately, an investigation of the letter by the Swiss
<>Government found it to be a forgery., The announcement of
this fact served to calm public opinion in Switzerland.,
To pacify Germany, the Swiss Minister to Berlin, in an
address to the Swiss residents of Munich, spoke favorably
of the Munich Agreement and recognized the right of self-
determination of peoples07^ Switzerland essentially took
the lead in restoring the relations which had been disrupted
by the forged letter and the consequences of its publication
Germany further warned the Swiss that if they intended to
be regarded as a neutral power, the anti-German agitation
77in the Swiss press must come to a halto
By the end of 193&? German pressure on the Swiss 
Government had successfully forced the Swiss to rely upon 
armed neutrality as the best possible means to avoid involve 
ment in any conflict0 During 1939? Hitler was determined 
to see that Switzerland adhered to this policy and if neces­
sary would defend its frontiers against a possible threat
75dgfp, d,v, 7010
76Ibid0. 702o
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from France 0
The Franco-British ”Gentleman’s Agreement,” when 
announced in the press on March 27, 1939, brought immediate 
reaction from Berlin„ By the terms of the Agreement, France 
and Great Britain agreed to recognize a violation of Swiss, 
Dutch, or Belgian neutrality as a casus b e l l i Weizsaeker 
demanded an immediate elucidation of the extent of Swiss 
participation in the affair0 Switzerland, in fact, had 
had no knowledge of the Agreement until March 21, when the 
French informed the Swiss Minister to Paris, whereupon the 
Swiss merely took note of the Agreement while emphasizing 
that it remained for Switzerland to decide when interven­
tion was necessary,79 Germany interpreted the Swiss answer 
as a formal acceptance of the guarantee and charged that 
the Swiss were following a one-sided policy incompatible 
with neutrality„ The controversy continued until July 20, 
when under German pressure, Switzerland issued a note on 
its neutrality stating that Switzerland’s right to invoke 
the help of other states in the event of a breach of neu­
trality was uncontestedo Such help could only be afforded 
in response to Switzerland’s explicit request<> Unsolicited
intervention of a third state had to be viewed as a viola-
SOtion of neutralityo The note did little to convince
7%reat Britain, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 
1919-1939, Third Series, TTlLondonT"l949J'> 100-101»
79DGFP, D, VI, 2S6-2S7,
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Berlin of Switzerland’s nonparticipation in the Agreement,, 
German interests demanded that Switzerland remain neutral 
in all respects, and the alleged Swiss participation in the 
Franco-British guarantee was seen as a Swiss move into the 
French orbit„
Germany continued to maintain pressure on Switzer­
land until late August to insure that the Swiss would remain 
neutral should the Reich become engaged in a conflict in the 
Easto On August 13, 1939, Foreign Minister Motta publicly 
emphasized the importance of Switzerland’s "unfettered 
neutrality" and restated the Swiss position that the Franco- 
British negotiations were conducted without Swiss knowledge0 
Switzerland, as always, would rely upon its own military 
forces for defense and would accept help only upon its 
own requesto Shortly after Motta?s speech, the matter 
of the "Gentleman’s Agreement" was allowed to drop, and 
Hitler once more declared his intention to respect Swiss 
neutralityo
On August 25, Ribbentrop sent notes to the European 
neutrals assuring them of Germany’s respect for their neu­
trality and demanding in return that these states resist
82attempts by third parties to infringe on their neutrality,,
On the following day, Switzerland declared its intention to
eiDGFP, D, VI, 949°
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maintain the "strictest neutrality" in case of war „
In August and September 1939, Switzerland took 
measures to safeguard the country,, Frontier forces were 
called up, and the sales of food stuffs suspended? A state 
of active service was declared on August 29, and the Assem­
bly elected a commander-in-chief for the Swiss army,,
General mobilization took place on September 2, and the usual 
mining of bridges and tunnels was ordered0 Thus at the 
time of the invasion of Poland, Switzerland had followed 
the course of action which Germany had worked to insure 
in its relations with Switzerland0
As further proof of its intention to remain neutral 
in all respects, Switzerland, on Germany’s demand, requested 
that the League session of November 10 be exclusively con­
fined to discussion of the Russo-Finnish c o n f l i c t A f t e r  
the fall of Poland, the Swiss had no choice but to defend 
their neutrality, since only this policy offered the pos­
sibility of escaping involvement in war0 The failure of 
France to aid the Poles further undermined Swiss faith 
in France, although secret military talks continued with 
the French General Staffo
Germany?s attitude toward Swiss neutrality over 
the preceding seven years had been determined by a mixture
^3DGFP, D, VI, 312o 
■^Ibid., VIII, 495-96«,
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of diplomacy and propaganda which inadvertently led Swit­
zerland to adopt a course most favorable to the Reicho 
Nazi propaganda, rather than converting the Swiss to National 
Socialism, succeeded only in alienating them0 No Swiss 
was anxious to see German-speaking Switzerland absorbed 
in Hitler?s "greater Germany0" German propaganda, which 
continually emphasized this point, convinced the Swiss that 
the Nazi regime represented a threat to Swiss independence <>
As a result, Switzerland emphasized its neutrality and 
undertook a program of rearmament in order to be able to 
defend its neutrality if necessary<, In reality, a rearmed 
and neutral Switzerland was in the political and military 
interest of Germany and met with German approval, since, 
in Weizsaeker ?s words, Germany could "wish for nothing 
better on its southern frontier than a firm buttress and 
guarantee against surprises0"
German success in Austria and Czechoslovakia under­
mined Swiss faith in the League of Nations, and the Swiss 
reverted to their traditional policy of absolute neutrality 
in May 1 9 3 announcing their intention to defend the country 
against all aggressors0 By the beginning of the war, the 
Swiss were firmly entrenched in their policy of neutrality 
and determined to prevent any violation of the Swiss fron­
tier by force of arms0
The failure of Nazi propaganda offers an explanation 
for the failure of the Reich to attempt an Anschluss with
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Switzerlando Swiss Nazi organizations never achieved a 
following similar to the Sudeten and Austrian Nazi Parties0 
The stability of the Swiss state and the loyalty of the 
Swiss to their established form of federal government pre­
served Switzerland from the fate of newly created Austria 
and Czechoslovakiao The idea of an Anschluss9 however, 
remained a hope of Nazi leaders throughout the war, but 
conditions for a successful attempt failed to materialize0
CHAPTER III
SWITZERLAND IN -GERMAN STRATEGY, 1940-1943
After annexing the Saarland, Austria, the Sudeten- 
land and Danzig, the Third Reich lacked only one region 
in Europe with a sizable German-speaking population0 Swit­
zerland alone retained its independence, but there was 
no doubt in Berlin that sooner or later the "Suedmark" 
would be incorporated into Hitler’s "greater Germanyo”
As in the prewar years, Nazi party members continually 
talked of incorporating Switzerland, but such talk repre­
sented only unofficial rumors which were utilized for their 
psychological effects on the Swiss« The threat of a German 
invasion was sufficient to prevent Switzerland’s aligning 
itself with Germany?s enemies„ Whether official plans for 
such an event were ever drawn up by the Foreign Ministry 
or by the Foreign Office is obscure„
Stuttgart, the nearest large German city to Swit­
zerland was made the seat of various official and unofficial 
German agencies assigned to operate in Switzerland-T-to 
conduct propaganda, organize spying, and carry out acts of 
s a b o t a g e A  small number of German nationals living in 
Switzerland were organized into a section of the Nazi Party,
■^David Jo Dallin, Soviet Espionage (New Haven, 1964) 
191° /Hereafter cited as Dallin, Soviet Espionage^/7
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while Swiss nationals with National Socialist leanings were 
united in the "National Front" and other such organizations, 
all of them controlled and financed by Berlin,,
Of all the German-speaking countries and areas in 
Europe, Switzerland was the least sympathetic toward Nazi 
Germany, and the majority of Germans living in Switzerland 
were especially antagonistic toward Nazism,, Efforts in 
northern Switzerland to build up a movement like the Henlein 
movement of the Sudetenland were small and could be sup­
pressed by the cantonal police when necessary0 This state 
of public opinion was one of the reasons for Germany’s 
decision not to invade Switzerland, and in the long run it 
saved the country from occupation and devastation^
During the period of the "phoney war," Germany 
gave no indication that a change in its attitude toward 
Switzerland was imminent„ In an address to the Reichstag 
on October 6, 1939, Hitler issued peace appeals to France 
and Great Britain and reviewed Germany’s friendly relations 
with the European neutrals over the past seven years0 In 
reference to Switzerland, the Fuehrer observed:
o o o „ Germany adopted the same attitude toward 
Switzerlando The Reich Government has never given 
the slightest cause for doubting their desires to 
establish friendly relations with the country0 
Moreover, they themselves have never brought forward
2Dallin, Soviet Espionage, 191-92,
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any complaint regarding the relations between the 
two countries„3
The Reich?s new Minister to Switzerland, Dr« Otto 
Koecher,^ met with President Henry Vallotton in February 
of 1940 and assured him that it was ”urgently necessary” 
for Germany to leave Switzerland out of the w a r Since 
the Minister ps statement was unauthorized, he requested 
that Vallotton not repeat it to the Swiss press0 At the 
same time, he tried to impress upon the President that it 
was equally necessary for the Swiss press to adopt a new 
attitude toward Nazi Germany
Strict control over the press was not yet imposed, 
although some officials began to consider this policy 
necessary to insure that the press would not provoke a 
German attack on Switzerland0 The strongly anti-Nazi Swiss 
press, as noted above, had been one of the main causes of 
friction between Germany and Switzerland since 1933« In 
view of the fate of the Austrians, Czechs and Poles, restric­
tion if not complete government censorship did not appear 
to be an unreasonable policyo
Switzerland for its part continued to regard the
^Hitler, My. New Order, 742-43 0
^Dr0 Otto Koecher replaced Weizsaeker as Minister 
to Berne and served in that capacity from 1937-1945<>
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maintenance of armed neutrality as the only means by which 
the country could maintain its independence and escape in­
volvement in the war„ The Swiss mobilization of September 
1939 was not a strategic deployment of forces but merely 
a measure to enable the army to combine in the north against 
a German attack, or in the west in the event of a French
attack,, The Commander of the Swiss Army, General Henri
7Guisan, believed that Hitler would not be content with 
the acquisition of Poland and feared that Switzerland might 
be Germany's next objective„ He therefore utilized the 
period of the ”phoney warT? to prepare an operational plan 
in case of a German attack across Switzerland's northern
sifrontiero
After his so-called T,peaee speech1’ of October 6 
failed to elicit a favorable response from the British and 
French, Hitler began to consider preparations for an attack 
on Franceo On October 22, he designated November 12 as the 
date for the beginning of the western offensive„ However,
7In Switzerland the position of Commander of the 
Swiss Army is elective,, In peace time the Swiss Army, which 
is a militia army, is commanded by men of the rank of Colo­
nel o In the event of a war, the Swiss Federal Assembly 
elects a commander of the Army, who is given the rank of 
general for the duration of the crisis0 On September 29, 
1939, the Assembly elected Henri Guisan, a well-to-do 
farmer from French-speaking Switzerland to command its 
army0 The ’’General,” as he was known, represented Switzer­
land's will to resist and enjoyed immense popularity through­
out the war„
BGeneral Henri Guisan, Bericht an die Bundesver- 
sammlung ueber den Aktivdienst ,”l939-1945*r~TZurich, 1946),
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unfavorable weather conditions forced postponement of the 
November deadline , a process which was to be repeated fif­
teen times before the end of 1939°
On January 1, 1940, Hitler was once again forced
to postpone the offensive0 On this date * an entry in the
journal of General Haider, Chief of Staff of the Army
(OKH or Oberkommando des Heeres),^ indicates that Hitler
was considering the possibility of undertaking an advance
into southern France0 General Haider noted the following
in his Journal;
Italy; Mussolini has sent word that he will approach 
the Fuehrer with proposals by the middle of January„
Use of Italians in German operations in the West; The 
Fuehrer is thinking of independent missions; Southern 
Frances through Savoy, to the southwest; Even our 
promise to Switzerland would be no real obstacle
Even before Germanyfs attack on Poland, Mussolini 
had been forced to admit to Hitler that his army could not 
be prepared for a European war before 1942 and could not 
enter the war without extensive German supplies<, In a 
letter to Hitler in January 1940, Mussolini made no mention
9̂General Frans Haider succeeded General Ludwig Beck 
as Chief of Staff in 193$ and served until September 1942, 
when* because of numerous conflicts with Hitler, he was dis­
missed o Haider came from a Catholic , Bavarian family with 
a tradition of producing general staff officers„ Because 
of his Catholicism and general staff outlook, he seldom got 
along with Hitler, particularly during the Russian campaign,, 
In 1944s he was arrested in connection with the events of 
July 20 but not brought to trial,,
^•^Franz Haider, Private War Journal of Generaloberst 
Franz Haider„ III, 113o
65
of any Italian action in southern France but suggested 
instead that Hitler conclude a compromise peace„ Opposed 
to an extension of the war in the west* he urged Hitler
11to turn back and seek Germany’s Lebensraum in the easta 
Mussolini’s reluctance to undertake an operation against 
the French forced Hitler to abandon his plans in this 
area and to reconsider the offensive in the north„
In the same month, a German Air Force staff officer 
was forced to make an emergency landing in Belgium, and a 
portion of the plans for the western offensive fell into 
Belgian hands0 Following the incident* Hitler postponed 
the offensive until the spring of 1940, since it was neces­
sary to consider modifying the plans for the offensive0
With the western offensive out of his mind for the 
time being, Hitler devoted his energies to preparing for 
an attack on the Scandinavian countries,, On February 20, 
he appointed General Falkenhorst, who had served in Finland
r
in 191&s to take over preparations for the attack on .Den­
mark and Norway,, It was not known definitely whether the 
attack on the Scandinavian countries would precede the 
western offensive until March 26 when on the reeommenda- 
tions of the Navy, Hitler affirmed that "Weser Uebung” 
the attack on the Scandinavian countries should come before 
the attack on Francec A week later, the Fuehrer designated
'^Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (N0Y0,
1962), 571-720
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April 9 as the date for the beginning of the operation„ 
Germany’s attack on Norway and Denmark deeply 
shocked the Swiss to whom it was incomprehensible that the 
two democracies should yield to Nazi demands0 Even more 
incomprehensible was the fact that there were men willing 
to cooperate with the aggressor against their own home­
land 0 The Swiss now assumed that they saw the Nazi system 
exposed; the methodical undermining of morale in neutral
countriess creation of disorders * and the organization of 
1 2defeatism*,
On April IS, the Federal Council and General Guisan 
issued a joint call for mobilization in the event of a sur­
prise attack and prepared to take measures to combat defeat­
ism among the p o p u l a c e T h e  Swiss press reacted so vio­
lently to the German attack in the north that the government 
was finally required to request that the press exercise 
restrainto The criticism of the Swiss press did not escape 
the notice of the German Foreign Minister * Ribbentrop„ On 
May 2, he announced to Hans Froelicher that the Reich, which 
had already shown "angelic patience" in regard to Switzer­
land;, would tolerate no more abuse from the Swiss press and 
intended to retaliate in its own press„ At the same time s 
Ribbentrop stated that the Reich would regard Switzerland’s
12DGFP, D, IX, 220o 
13Ibid* 219o
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granting of an agrement to the Polish Exile Government as 
an unfriendly act and intended to recall its minister from 
Berne if the agrement were granted
Faced with the possibility of a break in diplomatic 
relations, the Swiss Government informed Berlin that T,in 
order to comply with the request expressed to Herr Froe­
licher by the Foreign Minister , the Swiss Government would 
not grant the agrement to a Polish Minister for the time* IwV    II II IgjTMi”
being
During April9 the Swiss General Staff concentrated 
on strengthening the German-Swiss frontier in preparation 
for a German -invasion from the north, a measure which 
necessitated further weakening of the country ?s defenses
i f.in the west0
German planning for the attack in the west took 
its final form in the f,Hitler~Mansteinn plan0 On May 10s 
the plan was put into operation with Army Group B thrust­
ing through the Low Countries toward northern France, while 
Army Group A simultaneously advanced through the Ardennes 
with the task of cutting off the enemy forces in northern 
France from the southo Farther south, opposing the French 
between the Moselle and the Swiss frontier, Army Group G
14DGFP, D, IX, 270o 
15Ibido9 271o 
l^Guisan, Bericht, 26„
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took no offensive action until June 16 9 when it advanced 
to southern France,,
The Swiss General Staff knew of German plans in 
advance through a secret channel of communications, known 
as the "Viking Line/1 which was maintained by the Chief 
of the German Military Intelligences, Admiral Canaris 
Through the-"Viking Lines," Canaris was able to inform the 
Swiss of discussions in the High Command of the Armed 
Forces (OKW or Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) which Involved 
the possible invasion of Switzerland,, Between May 5 and 
May 7 S the Swiss were warned Of the possibility of an im­
minent German invasion and advised to mobilize,, However9 
there are two possible motives for the Admiral?s initial 
warning,. Possibly he suspected that the Ardennes offen­
sive would be unsuccessful? forcing Hitler to thrust his 
left flank through Switzerland and.- the Belfort Gap„ On 
the other hand , it is equally possible that Canaris made 
this feint to alarm the French and lead them to tie down 
strong forces in the Belfort area at a time when such 
forces would have served a more useful function farther
“̂ Admiral Wilhelm Canaris s Chief of Amtsgruppe 
Ausland/Abwehr (intelligence in OKW) 1938-19449 when dis­
missed owing to frequent quarrels with the SS; involved 
indirectly in the plot to assassinate Hitler on July 209 
1944; hanged in Flossenburg concentration camp in April 
1945° He has been described as "the secret genius of op­
position" and his "Inner circle" as the very cabinet of 
the resistance movements,' yet there is little evidence to 
substantiate these claims0
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north
In any event s the attack on France came as no sur­
prise to the Swiss military who had awaited the event» but 
among the populace of northern Switzerland a general panic 
resulted which reached its high point on the night of 
May 14o At this moment, it appeared to Guisan that Swit­
zerland stood in actual danger of an attacko If the German 
offensive at Sedan had not been successful * he expected 
the release of a supplementary operation in the south 
with the intention of skirting the French defensive posi­
tions,, German forces appeared to be prepared for this
objective, which would probably have run its coarse through 
i 9Switzerland „
Fortunately for the Swiss, the Ardennes offensive 
was a complete success , and the immediate danger diminishedo 
As the western offensive progressed, the German press in­
creased its caustic and insolent tone toward Switzerland„ 
Over the radio, songs of the Hitler.jugend scorned Swiss 
independence and hinted that the Reich would deal with
O f )Switzerland after the French were defeated0
After Italy5s entry into the war and the subsequent
1 $Ian Colvin, Chief of Intelligence (London, 1951)? 
114o /Hereaft er cited as Colvin, Chief of Intelligence07
■^Guisan, Bericht» 27-2B0
20Peter Duerrenmatt, Kleine Geschichte der Schweiz 
waehrend des Zwelten Weltkrieges (Zurich, 1943TT53.
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fall of Frances German respect for Swiss neutrality de­
creased proportionallyo While the Swiss frontier was 
generally respected on the ground * German pilots on flights 
between Germany and occupied France tended to ignore Swiss 
neutralityo The Swiss Air Forces in turn,, defended the 
air over the country9 engaging the Luftwaffe whenever a 
violation of Swiss air space occurred0 On five occasions, 
both Goering vs Luftwaffe and the Swiss Air Force suffered
losses of planes and pilots0 Field Marshal (later Reichs-
21marshal/ Hermann Goering ' was determined to halt the los­
ses to his Luftwaffe over Switzerland and. on his own auth­
ority s concocted a plan for a. sabotage mission against the 
Swiss air fields 0 On June 14» nine saboteurs entered 
Switzerland with the objective of sabotaging airfields 
at Lausannej Payerne* Biel“Boeaingens Duebendorf and Sprei- 
tenbacho The operation9 designated as t!Unternehmen Wartega' 
was strictly an amateur operation and failed completely
with most of the saboteurs taken into custody within twenty- 
22four hourso
"(Jnternehmen Wartegau.n was but one of a number of 
Nazi attempts at sabotage and espionage in Switzerland
21 Hermann Goering} Reich Minister for ..Air* Reich 
Minister for the Four-Year Plan* Commander in Chief of the 
Luftwaffe throughout the war»
22H0R 0 Kurz, Die Schweiz in der Planung der krleg- 
fuehrenden Maechte wa'ehrent des Zweiten Weltkrieges~TBiels 
195777" 5 7  THereafter cited as Kurz, Die Schweiz In der 
Planung 0/
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which eventually began to have a definite effect on Swiss 
morale0 Switzerland was completely surrounded by Axis Powers 
and occupied France, except for a narrow corridor from 
Geneva to Vichy France0 Chances of being able to pursue 
an independent policy were limited., In these circumstances;, 
it is not surprising that some people felt that Switzerland 
shouldj by economic and political adaptation, qualify itself 
for a favorable position in Hitler’s nNew Europeo5' During 
the summer of 1940s there was considerable public and press 
discussion of renewal and adaptation of Swiss institutions 
and policieso President Pilet-Golaz, in a speech on June 25s 
encouraged the advocates of adaptation when he spoke of the 
need for economic adaptation and warned his countrymen 
that they would have to accept changes in their way of 
life0 Moreover, he noted that the government would no 
longer be able to explain and justify its decisions to the 
publico The President’s speech came under immediate 
attack by the opponents of adaptation0 But at the same 
time, the speech stimulated the defeatist element which 
began to center on the Presidents
During the Battle of Britain the Nazi press attacked 
the Swiss press for its alleged lack of impartiality and 
accused- the Swiss of a violation of neutrality0 Restric­
tions finally became a necessity; the Swiss papers were not
2S"'Toynbee, War and the Neutrals9 2110
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allowed to publish articles and comment of a hostile or 
unduly critical character which might make relations with 
Germany more difficult„ In spite of the restrictions, the 
Germans and their junior partnerP Italy9 remained unappeased 
Additional concessions to the Axis Powers became necessary 
as the war progressed,, Shortly after the German-French 
Armistice, Switzerland agreed to hand over to Germany the 
war material belonging to interned Polish and French soldiers„ 
German pressure also brought about the blackout of Swiss 
towns at night, since their lights served to guide Allied 
pilots to Axis targets
The German High Command did not seriously begin 
to consider the possibility of an attack on Switzerland 
until after the fall of France„ In comparison to Belgium 
and Holland;, Switzerland was only of minor operational sig­
nificance during the course of the war9 and in the first 
part of the war an outflanking of the Maginot Line through 
Switzerland was never seriously c o n s i d e r e d G e r m a n  troop 
movements which the Swiss intelligence detected in the 
vicinity of the Swiss frontier were not preparations for 
an attack on Switzerland but were designed merely to deceive
24-Toynbeej War and the Neutrals 9 212 0 
25Ibido
p Bernhard von Lossbergj Im Wehrmachtfuehrungstab; 
Bericht eines Generalstabsoffizlers THamburg ? 195077 u02~
Z^rei7tir~TitiT”as^Tosi¥ei^, Im Wehrmachtfuehrungstab07
the French General S t a f f T h e  mountainous character of 
the country mad® it unsuitable both for troop movements 
and as a staging area from which an attack on France could 
be launched„ With Italy's declaration of war, Switzerland 
increased in military and economic importance to the Axis, 
since the main connection between Italy and Germany depended 
on Swiss railways and tunnels» In addition, Swiss deliver­
ies of precision machines to Great Britain, as well as 
the country's role as a rendezvous for international es­
pionage, tended to focus Hitler's attention on the country»
2 $After the victory in the west, General Jodi,
Chief of the OKW Operations Staff, ordered the Operations 
Staff to investigate the possibility of an attack on Swit­
zerland but not to share the information with OKH or other 
headquarters The Staff based its plan upon the occupa­
tion of the Swiss ’’middle-land” — the region between the 
Juras and the Alps0 This region was considered to be mili­
tarily accessibleo Equally important, it contained the 
major Swiss industrial centers, including the clock, machine,
27Lossberg, Im Wehrmachtfuehrungstab 9 102-103 <>
2 SColonel General Alfred Jodi, Chief of the OKW 
Operations Staff, 1938-1945° In Hitler's reorganization 
of the German military in 1938, OKW was created as a kind 
of personal working staff--an office that supplied him with 
information and circulated and supervised his orders0 In 
essence, OKW was a half military and half political organi­
zation with no relation to real general staff work as car­
ried on by OKHo
^Lossberg, Im Wehrmachffuehrungstab, 1020
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textile and aluminum i n d u s t r i e s M a j o r  transportation
routes led from the Rhine and Rhone valleys into the "middle
land" and then over the Alpine passes into Italy0
The OKW plan projected an advance by light motorized
forces into Switzerland west of Lake Constance0 After
crossing the Rhine, the force was to continue advancing
toward the southwest o A second force, composed of mountain
troops, was to begin its advance from the north on both
sides of Basel and proceed directly southo Simultaneously,
a third force was to advance up the Rhone Valley into
southeastern Switzerland <> OKW?s operational plan was
strictly a German undertaking with no consideration given
 ̂1to the possible use of Italian forces o-'-1- If successful, 
the operation would encircle the mass of the Swiss Army 
in the "middle land0"
Occupation of Switzerland offered considerable 
economic benefits for the Reich as well as control of the 
Swiss tunnels and railways which provided the main connec­
tion between Italy and Germany0 The strategically impor­
tant railway lines, especially the Gotthard Line and the 
Simplon Line, carried most of Germanyfs supplies to Italy
30Lossberg, Im Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab, 103-104<> 
31Ibid0, 104o
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and also to the Axis forces in A f r i c a „32
0KW?s plan was never to attain operational signify 
icance during the course of the warD Upon its completion, 
the plan was presented to General Jodi , who filed it in 
his desk for use should a favorable opportunity present 
itselfo
A second operational plan for military action 
against Switzerland , known under the code name Operation 
Tannenbaum, was undertaken at approximately the same time 
as the OKW plan0 Tannenbaum„ however, was initially drawn 
up by the OKH Operations Staff0 On June 25, the Operations 
Staff prepared a memorandum concerning the npossibility 
of a surprise occupation of Switzerland by German troops 
from France and Germany, on the assumption that Italian 
troops will attack simultaneously from the south„n33
In view of Switzerland?s long frontiers, OKH plan­
ners expected no offensive by the Swiss Army which they 
assumed would have to be restricted rather to a defense 
of the completed frontier positions„ At this time (late 
June 1940}, the Germans took into account th© fact that
3^The Swiss tunnels were among the longest in the 
world—-Gotthards nine miles; Simplon, 12D4 miles; Loetsch- 
berg, nine miles„ The three tunnels provided the most 
effective connection between Germany and Italy, which 
depended heavily upon Germany for supplies, especially 
coal for its steel industry,, An alternate route via the 
Brenner Pass could not accommodate the amount of supplies 
necessary for Italy and for the Axis forces in Africa0
33Rurz3 Die Schweiz in der Planung, 28.,
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the weakest Swiss .forces lay along the French-German border 
and that a Swiss attempt to move troops to the western 
frontier would correspondingly weaken the northern defenses0
Success of any operation against the Swiss depended 
upon the surprise and speed with which the country could be 
occupiedo The initial OKH plan recommended that the advance 
against the Swiss Army should be undertaken from several 
directions to prevent formation of a unified command or an 
organized withdrawal into the impassable mountainous ter­
rain 0 OKH realized that a successful Swiss withdrawal into 
the central massif would delay and possibly prevent a deci­
sive v i c t o r y 0 The main emphasis of the attack was placed 
in the west where the Alps were to be crossed near Savoy 
and the Juras penetrated at several locations while the 
Rhine was being crossed in the north„ For political and 
morale reasons9 it was deemed necessary to capture the capi­
tal and military districts quickly and while they were still 
intact 0-̂ 5 As a final note^ the initial memorandum stated 
that the possibility of settling German differences with 
Switzerland by peaceful means still e x i s t e d 6
Further work on the operation was discontinued 
until August j, but by this time it was necessary to consider
■^Kurz 5 Die Schweiz in der Planung, 29«.
 ̂̂ Ibid 0
36Ibld0, 3Go
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two new problems in regard to Swiss strength, During the 
interval, Switzerland had increased the strength of its 
field divisions and it could perhaps count on the help 
of 40,000 interned French and Polish soldiers0
The operational plan designed in August deviated 
little from the guide lines set down by the initial mem­
orandum,, The aim. of the operation was to defeat the enemy 
quickly before it could retreat into the Alps„ The major 
blow was to fall on the western border, since Swiss forces 
in this area remained weaker than those in the north and 
Swiss industrial centers could be reached most easily from 
the west. An attack across the Rhine in the north was 
designed mainly as a deceptive measure, while no attack was 
planned on SwitzerlandSs eastern frontier„ Heavy fortifi­
cations, as well as the difficulties of terrain, presented 
the attacker with too many obstacles in the east0 Italian 
forces were allotted the occupation of the Chur-Davos area, 
as well as the Rhone Valley„37
The task of executing Tannenbaum went to General 
von Listfs Twelfth Army, which included three army corps—  
the XII, XV and XVIII0 Included in the three corps were 
five infantry divisions, three motorized divisions, and a 
mountain division and a Panzer division„ Two motorized SS 
regiments completed the force0 Because the Battle of
“̂ Kurz, Die Schweiz in der Planting, 30„
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Britain was still in progress» the degree of part i sipa 
tion by the Luftwaffe was not clearly determineds although 
it was assumed that the Luftwaffe would conduct independent 
bombing missions and provide ground support
While the single mountain division was to effect a 
crossing of the Juras * the infantry divisions were to lead 
the breakthrough of the fortified positions and move toward 
the closer objectives„ To prevent a possible evasion of the 
Swiss to the south or southeast * paratroop landings (which 
were also limited because of the Battle of Britain) at the 
Linthkanal and at- Sargens were planned D The Luftwaffe 
was assigned the tasks of destroying the enemy air forces 
and providing air support for the ground troops0 By landing 
Luftwaffe units at Olten* the Operations Staff hoped to 
close that exit through the J u r a s -9
The timetable for the operation provided a minimum 
of six dayso Bernes Lucerne and Zurich were to be taken 
during the first two days9 while the remaining operations9 
depending on the success of the Italians * would take another 
three to four dayso The operation was to take place in 
the summer months* since from October to May snowfall in 
the mountains would cause delays and fog might impair the 
activity of the Luftwaffe0 OKH designated September as the
3%urz* Die Schweiz in der Planung;, 30*
39Ibido
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most favorable month04Q
The next phase of planning for Operation Tannenbaum 
occurred within Army Group C 3 commanded by Field Marshal 
Ritter von Leebs General von List^s immediate superior0 
On August 26, General Haider signed a memorandum directing 
von Leeb to submit an operational plan for an attack on 
Switzerlando
Von Leeb l?s plan assigned Operation Tannenbaum to 
the Twelfth Army but restricted its objective to a line 
running from Lake Geneva northeast to Sargens 0 South of 
the linep Italian forces were to undertake independent 
operations 9 and southern Switzerland was designated as an 
Italian sphere of influence0 In the north 9 the Twelfth 
Army was to destroy the Swiss forces quickly by attacks 
from several directions and occupy the capitolj industrial 
and armament centers„ Von Leeb forwarded the skeleton plan 
to the headquarters of the Twelfth Army for von List 's 
comments0 As a result9 the plan was delayed until Septem­
ber 7? after which von Leeb made a final revisiono^
In contrast to the earlier plans, von Leeb shifted 
the main emphasis from the center of the Jura front to its 
outer flankso Superior Panzer and motorized forces were 
to advance on the southern flank between Lake Geneva and
^Kurz, Die Schweiz in der Planung8 31o See Appen­
dix Ao
U Ibido, 33-34o
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the Neuenburger see while a similar force effected an entry 
in the north between Waldshut and Lake Constance0 By this 
means a deep and fast advance along the western edge of the 
Alps would be achieved , initiating an outflanking and encir­
clement of the major enemy forces in the Swiss "middle land0" 
In spite of the greater distances, flanking movements were 
preferred to frontal attacks through the Juras
For the operation, von Leeb divided the Twelfth Army 
Info five attack groups (Angriffsgruppen)„ Group A, composed 
of two Panzer divisions, two infantry divisions, a mountain 
division and a motorized division, was to cross the Swiss 
frontier in the south between Lake Geneva and the Neuen- 
burgersee0 The southern prong of the group was assigned 
the task of seizing Geneva while.the major portion of the 
group advanced toward Berne, Fribourg and Thun0 The moun­
tain division and Infantry division of Group B were to pene­
trate the Juras near Biel and advance past Biel to Burgdorfo 
Group C, with two infantry divisions and a Panzer division, 
was to cross the frontier in the north on both sides of Basel 
and advance generally south toward Huttwilo The strongest 
northern unit (Group D) included two Panzer divisions, two 
infantry divisions and a motorized divlsion<, Its five 
divisions were to cross the German-Swiss frontier between 
Waldshut and Lake Constance and advance southward toward
42j[urz s Die Schweiz in der Planung, 3 5 -3 6 <>
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Zuricho Group E was to mount the only attack in the 
east with a mountain division and an infantry division.
Its objectives were Stc Gallen, Gams, Glarus, Chur and 
Llanz
The Luftwaffe was assigned the usual tasks of 
destroying the enemy air force and the communications 
systems by attacks on Berne 5, Lucerne, Thun, Interlaken, 
Zurich and Solothurn0̂ -
If successful, von Leeb’s plan would encircle the 
Swiss Army in the ’'middle land” before an organized retreat 
could be carried out and before the Swiss could effectively 
destroy the Gotthard and Simplon tunnels0
To disguise the assembly of motorized and Panzer 
units near the Swiss frontiers, it was proposed to allow 
an "aggravation of the occupation of France in connection 
with the failure to fulfill the Armistice stipulations” 
to precede the attack,, Simultaneously, the Swiss were to 
be further deceived by "benevolent handling in the German 
newspapers and through economic agreements <,
Von Leeb9s plan found unconditional support neither 
with the OKH Operations Staff under Colonel Heusinger nor 
with General Haider0 Heusinger found the proposed troop
^ K u r z , Die Schweiz in der Planung, 360 See 
Appendix B 0
^ I b l d .
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estimates disproportionately high in comparison to the Swiss 
defensive forces0 He recommended the removal of Group E 
and restriction of the operation to a single army group of 
eleven divisions
General Haider also recommended removal of Group E, 
but he further suggested the uniting of Groups A and B 
and C and D under a single commando The goals were modi­
fied in the sense that A and B , the western units with a 
strong motorized right flank, would break through the 
frontier between Geneva and the Neuenburgersee and advance 
to Berne and Lucerne0 The unified northern groups with 
a strong motorized left flank were to cross the frontier 
near Waldshut and advance southward to Lucerne0 Thus, 
while the motorized outer flanks were encircling the ”mid­
dle land,” the non-motorized units were to advance on 
Basel, Waldshut, Olten, Solothurn and Berne0 In this way, 
Haider created two operational spheres--=an inner sphere in 
which the non-motorized forces operated and an outer sphere 
allocated to the movement of motorized units„ The area 
seized between the motorized and non-motorized forces would 
contain the mass of the Swiss Army before an organized 
withdrawal into the mountains could be accomplished
Haider¥s revision represented the final stage of
^6Kurz, Die Schweiz in der P.lanung,
^ ^Ibido See Appendix C 0
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.Operation Tannenbaum, but by this time (October 17, 1940), 
the favorable time for execution of the operation had 
passedo Hitler was preoccupied with several other major 
problems, namely the attacks on Great Britain and Russia„
In relation to these operations, Switzerland was insignifi­
cant,, In any event, the country was surrounded by Axis 
territory, and there would be abundant time to deal with 
the Swiss after Britain and Russia were subdued„ For the 
time being, the Fuehrer was content with economic concessions 
from the Swiss„ Planning for Operation Tannenbaum, while 
seriously studied between June and October 1940, remained 
in the nature of preparations in adventumo
The Swiss were alarmed by stories and rumors that 
Hitler intended to invade the country,, But such informa­
tion was spread by Nazi agents in Switzerland as well as by 
the German press in order to encourage Swiss defeatists and 
to insure that Switzerland would not allow any Allied brea­
ches of its neutralityo State Secretary von Weizsaeker, 
former Minister to Switzerland, noted in his Memoirs that 
such stories were in the nature of warning shots, but had 
no foundation in facto "If there had really been any in­
tention of invading Switzerland, this would not have escaped 
the notice of my still existing informants at 0KWoT'4fi
While planning for Tannenbaum continued throughout
^Weizsaeker, Memoirs, 243°
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the summer of 1940, the Swiss undertook measures to combat 
the growing defeatism in Switzerland and to revise the de­
fensive measures to be taken in the event of a German at­
tack o On June 25, General Guisan issued the order of the 
day to his troop commanders assembled on the Ruetli Meadow, 
the legendary spot where the Swiss Confederation had been 
founded in 1291o Guisan urged his officers to ignore the 
defeatists and remain steadfast in their resistance„ The 
defeatist atmosphere, which had been intensified by Musso­
lini ‘'s declaration of war and the fall of France, had made 
serious inroads among both the civil population and the 
army. At the Ruetli Meadow, Guisan made a patriotic appeal 
to the nation as a whole0 To the army, he stated that as 
long as the slightest expectation of military success 
existed the duty to defend Swiss honor must be observed 
to the utmost
To facilitate defense of the country, the general 
introduced the concept of the ’’National Redoubt,” a natural 
defensive system based on the Alpine fortresses of the 
Gotthard, Sargens and Sto M a u r i c e I n  the event that the 
Swiss Army could not prevent a German breakthrough of the 
frontier fortifications, the ’’National Redoubt” provided
49H oRo Kurz, Die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Das
grosse Erinnerungswerk an die Aktivdienstzeit„ 1939-194.5 
TThun7~T9^0T7l6: /Hereafter cited as Kurz, Die Schweiz im
Zweiten Weltkriego/
5°Tbxdo, l8 l 0
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a well-provisioned stronghold into which an organized re­
treat could be conductedo In essence, the villages and 
towns of Switzerland were to be left to the invader0 A 
successful withdrawal into the Alps offered the Swiss an 
opportunity to carry on partisan and guerrilla warfare 
against the occupier, thus preventing a quick defeat and 
forcing Germany to engage in a long and extensive opera­
tion,, The Swiss intended to destroy factories , armament 
centers and the tunnels themselves rather than allow them 
to fall into German hands intact 0
Taking account of the concept of the "Redoubt,n 
German planning for an attack on Switzerland emphasized 
the necessity of a quick victory over the Swiss while 
simultaneously blocking all routes of escape into the 
Alps o
Only a few days after Guisan?s address at Ruetli, 
a preliminary compilation of French documents captured 
at Dijon indicated collaboration of the Swiss General 
Staff with its French counterpart0 Official staff conver­
sations had not taken place, but semi-official conversations 
between Guisan and a French liason officer, Lt„ Colonel 
Garteiser, had occurred between May 1939 and March 19400 
The documents provided no evidence of French plans for 
marching into Switzerland for offensive reasons, but French 
intervention had been forseen in case of a German attack 
on Switzerland,,^
51DGFP, D, XI, 14”15o
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Although the evidence provided Hitler with a valid 
excuse to attack Switzerland, no German action followed,, 
Hitler was deeply concerned with British reaction to Ger­
man peace feelers, hoping that Great Britain would be 
willing to consider peace negotiations,, Quite possibly 
Hitler did not- want to engage in further aggression until 
sure of Britain?s position,, In any case, events in Swit­
zerland were proceeding to Germany’s advantage and satis­
faction,, Swiss defeatists began to clamor for Guisan?s 
dismissal and the demobilization of the Swiss A r m y „52 
It appeared possible that Germany might achieve its goals 
in Switzerland without resorting to an attack,,
Weizsaeker, who feared that Hitler might use the 
documents as an excuse to attack Switzerland, informed the 
Swiss through Theo Kordt, one of Canaris’s agents in the 
Berne Legation,, In Berlin, the State Secretary used his 
position to convince his colleagues in the Foreign Office 
that an attack on Switzerland would mean the immediate 
destruction of the Swiss tunnels and a subsequent paralysis 
of Italy’s steel industry for lack of coal„53 Admiral 
Canaris worked closely with the State Secretary to dis­
courage a German invasion of Switzerland, and it is possible 
that their activity played an important role in Germany’s
52DGFP, D, XI, 14»15.
^Weizsaeker, Memoirs, 243»
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decision not to take any action,,
After October 1940, Switzerland received little 
attention from the German High Command„ Military and poli­
tical considerations elsewhere in Europe occupied Hitler 
and his advisers0 The Swiss utilized the time to fortify 
and provision the"National Redoubt," while various economic 
concessions sufficed to allow Switzerland almost two years 
of relative peace„
The German press retained its arrogant tone, re­
minding the Swiss that they were originally part of the 
Reich and generally giving the impression that Germany was 
too busy to concern itself with Switzerland at the moment0 
In a speech at the Sportpalast 9 Hitler made reference to the 
"bourgeois states that would not survive the war," Swit­
zerland represented the most obvious example of such a 
stateo Paul Schmidt, Press Chief in the Foreign Ministry, 
threatened Swiss editors and journalists with deportation 
to Siberia or liquidation after the occupation of Switzer­
land „54 Between the fall of 1940 and the fall of 1-942, 
Germany generally paid little attention to the presence 
of a neutral, democratic state in the midst of Axis dominated 
Europeo The German press occasionally reminded the Swiss 
that their independence would be terminated when Hitler 
finished with Britain and Russia„ But even the press 
had little time to delegate to Switzerland during the
54T0ynbee, War and the Neutrals, 2210
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Russian campaign,
Switzerland utilized the interim to discourage 
defeatist and treasonable activity, Nineteen officers 
and men of the Swiss Army were sentenced to death for 
treason, while an additional number were given life sen­
tences o Arrests for espionage and sabotage totaled 312 
by 1942 s most of them Germans and Italians0^5 In additions 
the pro-Nazi National Front Movement was banneds press 
censorship and rule by decree introduced.
It was not until the fall of 1942 that Germany 
again began to consider an invasion of Switzerland, Feel­
ing that the Allies might in the future be thrusting into 
the ’’soft underbelly of Europe” the position of neutral 
Switzerland attracted Ribbentrop ys attention. In a note 
to the Legation In Berne he requested a report on the 
length of time for which the Swiss were equipped with pro­
visions and raw materials. The Legation pointed out in a 
detailed report that the Swiss had stored enough raw material 
and provisions to enable them to hold out for as long as two 
years in the ’’National Redoubt,” Realizing the motives 
behind the Foreign Minister ?s inquiry, Koecher emphasized 
that the Swiss would provide obstinate resistance and would ; 
on no account allow the vital communications routes through
55weizsaeker, Memoirs a 90°
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the Gotthard and Simplon Tunnels to fall intact into German 
hands„^
Admiral Canaris, informed of Ribbentrop’s inquiry 
through the Berne Legation, set his communications line 
into operation and warned the Swiss military of Ribbentrop’s 
planso However, the Admiral’s warning in this case differed 
from his earlier warnings„ Abwehr had information of Allied 
pressure on the Swiss to cut all rail communications between 
Germany and Italy, and allow Allied agents to blow up the 
Gotthard tunnel» Through the warning, Canaris intended to 
convey a threat to the Swiss and so keep rail communications 
openD 51
In September 1942, Colonel Masson, Chief of the 
Swiss Federal Intelligence Service (Nachriehtendienst), 
established contact with SS General Walter Schellenberg, 
head of the SS Foreign Intelligenee0 Schellenberg suggested 
a meeting for the purpose of discussing a possible German 
”preventive occupation” of Switzerland<> Certain circles 
in Germany were doubtful of Switzerland’s intention to 
defend its neutrality, especially in view of an Allied 
landing in Italyc Masson and Schellenberg met at Laufenburg 
in late September 1942, and Masson assured him of Switzerland’s 
intention to resist any violation of the nation’s neutrality„
^Abshagen, Canaris (Stuttgart, 1957), 346-47o
5^Colvin, Chief of Intelligence, 205=2060
90
The Swiss General Staff hoped to use the opportunity of con­
tact with Schellenberg to impress upon the Reich leaders 
that an attack on Switzerland would be an undertaking too 
costly to be profitable0
Although Hitler had been irked by Switzerland's 
neutrality and independences, the advantages which would 
have accrued from its invasion and conquest had been clearly 
outweighed by the drawbackso The Germans were well aware 
that an attack would be strongly resisted by the Swiss whose 
first defensive step would be to destroy the Gotthard and 
Simplon tunnels0 Restoration would be a lengthy undertaking 
even under favorable conditions, but harassed by guerrilla 
warfare by the Swiss the task of rebuilding the tunnels 
would present the conquerors with almost insuperable dif­
ficulties o Moreover, Switzerland's main assets * which 
were economic and financial , would be wiped out0 As there 
would be no compensatory rewards in the shape of raw mater­
ials and surplus food, a devastated and impoverished Swit­
zerland would be a liability rather than an asset„59 How­
ever , as the Allies continued to turn the tide in Africa 
and it became apparent than an invasion of Europe through 
Italy was imminents Switzerland's strategic location increased
5^Bernard Barbey, Fuenf Jahre auf dem Kommandoposten 
des Generals (Berne, 1 9 4 S a f t e r  cited as 
Barbey, Fuenf Jahre07
^Toynbeej, The War and the Neutrals „ 2210
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in importance to Berlin0 In March 1943 * OKW again took up 
the question of a ''preventive occupation" of Switzerland0 
General Schellenberg again contacted Masson and 
informed him that "Case Switzerland" ("Fall Schweiz") was 
being considered by 0KWo Masson9s assurances of the pre­
vious September no longer sufficed in Berlin; therefore a 
meeting with a leading Swiss personality was desired0 
General Schellenberg9s motives in March 1943 j as well as 
in September 1942, remain obscure» Allegedly he intended 
to use the meetings in Switzerland to warn the Swiss to 
prepare for a possible German attacko In so doing, his 
objective was to force the Swiss to take defensive pre­
cautions so that he could use the fact as an argument against
60Hitler ?s intended onslaught <,
Colonel Masson arranged a meeting between Schellen­
berg and General Buisan on March 9° Before Schellenberg 
was allowed to travel to Switzerland, Hitler expressed 
certain doubts about the conference0 He feared that Schel­
lenberg might use the opportunity to escape to England by 
plane and be held there like Rudolf Hessc On the other 
hand, the Fuehrer feared that the Italians would get word 
of the affair since Schellenberg was known to be an import­
ant personality in frequent contact with Himmler0 Schel­
lenberg !s trip to Switzerland might be interpreted by the 
Italians as an omen of defeat, since it appeared that
^%ilhelm Hoettl, The Secret Front (N0Y 0 , 1954) 9 64o
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Rommel*s defeat in Tunisia was imminent After some 
hesitation* Hitler finally gave his approval, and Schellen­
berg met Guisan at Biglen0 The SS general expressed the 
fear that the Swiss were not determined to defend the countryfs 
neutrality against the Allies if it should be necessary 
Guisan assured him of the determined conviction of the Swiss 
Army to fulfill its task under all circumstances and its 
intention to fight against anyone who should violate Swiss 
neutrality
Whether Schellenberg on his return to Berlin de­
cidedly influenced Hitler?s decision is difficult to deter­
mine o In his memoirs, Schellenberg asserted that through 
his influence with Himmler he was able to prevent the German 
occupation of Switzerland in 1943°64
On March 19* the Swiss learned that OKW intended to 
examine the location of Switzerland in relation to the 
general situation ivy Italy and the Mediterranean,,^ Addi­
tional reports reached the Swiss that General Dietl, the 
’’Hero of Narvik*” had assembled in Munich a special ”Kom~ 
mando Schweiz” whose task it was to lead the advance on 
Switzerlando In particular* paratroop units were said to
Barbey* Fuenf Jahre, 167-6$,,
62Ibido, 1680
Guisan* Bericht„ $2„
^Stfalter Schellenberg* The Labyrinth; Memoirs of 
Walter Schellenberg (N0Y0 * 19567'““377 '
^bGuisan* Bericht, 53°
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be assigned to Dietl8s force in large numbers,, It was their 
task to open an access into the ’’National R e d o u b t D u r i n g  
the following days it was learned that the "SS Circlet- 
above all Himmler and Sepp Dietrich--were in favor of the 
plan, while the generals and economic advisers opposed it<,66
Finally, on March 23, Schellenberg8s personal envoy 
appeared at the headquarters of the Swiss General Staff and 
announced that the Swiss could be satisfied with Schellenberg, 
for the danger of an attack had passed0 On the same day, 
word came via the "Viking Line" that "Case Switzerland" had 
been called off0̂ 7
Research since then, in particular the questioning 
of reliable German personalities who were involved in the. 
events of March 1943, indicate that the German leadership 
entertained no immediate aggressive intentions toward Swit­
zerland „ It is certain today that General Dietl was present 
almost without interruption at the headquarters of the Twen­
tieth Gebirgsarmee in Finnish Lappland, where he was occu­
pied with preparations for defense against an expected 
Russian offensive on the German-Finnish front„ The asser­
tion that Dietl was to provide the leadership for the attack 
on Switzerland served a propagandistic function, for the 
use of the name of the successful mountain general and "Hero
^Kurz, Die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 660
67Barbey? Fuenf Jahre, 1?20
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of Narvik” promised psychological results0 The March alarm, 
in essence, had no military significance0 Its main objective 
was to convince the Swiss that failure to defend their fron­
tier against possible Allied infringement might lead to a 
German preventive occupation of the country= Preventive 
occupation also provided a means to extract additional 
economic concessions from the Swiss„ On December 31? 1943? 
the German-Swiss trade agreement of 1941 was to expire 
without Germany fulfilling its stipulated commitments0 It 
is therefore possible that Germany used the March alarm as 
a means of applying economic pressure
In December 1943 ? the possibility of a German inva­
sion of Switzerland was discussed for the last time0 Unlike 
the previous operations, this final episode originated with 
the SS0 The SS version was designated as a "Memorandum on 
the military location of Switzerland under special considera­
tion of necessary German interventionD?,̂ 9 The operational 
planning took place in the Waffenhauptamt of the SS under 
the direction of Colonel Boehme0 The Axis encirclement of 
Switzerland represented a favorable operational position, 
permitting consideration of a minimum of forces to achieve 
two goals simultaneously— destruction of the Swiss army and 
elimination of support by the Allies„ Boehme planned the
6gKurz, Die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg? 66-67«
69Kurz, Die Schweiz in der Planung, 49=
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offensive in two phases, the first of which was designed to 
capture the "middle land," its air fields and the major 
portion of the enemy forces,, The second phase consisted of 
a thrust into the "National Redoubt" and occupation of its 
transportation routes. Above all, Boehme counted on the 
paralyzing effect of surprise coupled with the physical 
shock of massed artillery and tanks. He believed that he 
could be successful with about twelve divisions in addition 
to Sondertruppen and expected losses of approximately twenty 
per cent,
Boehme5s memorandum bore the date December 20, 1943 
and was planned as a "War for the Summer Months," Therefore, 
at the earliest the plan would be executed in the summer of 
1944? at; which time the Allied invasion was already in 
progress. In addition, by this time Germany no longer 
possessed a significant number of paratroop divisions 
which Boehme intended to use in the operation against the 
"National Redoubt," Since the whole operation was based 
upon assumptions no longer attainable, It never proceeded 
past the planning stage,71
By 1944, the threat of a German invasion of Switzer­
land had largely disappeared, German forces were engaged in 
Russia, Italy and France, Militarily, Germany could not
70Rurz, Die Schweiz in der Planung, 49-51.
71Ibid, 50=51.
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risk tying down valuable forces in Switzerland, even if 
enough forces could be foundD On the other hand, as Nazi 
power declined, the appeal of Nazism and the Swiss fear of 
an invasion also declined proportionally0 Germany was left 
with no choice but to depend on the Swiss to defend their 
neutrality against the Allies, if necessary«
Swiss fears that the Allies might violate their 
frontier proved unfounded0 After D-Day, General Guisan 
wished to call up additional forces, but upon considering 
the effect of mobilization upon the existent food supplies, 
the mobilization was restricted to frontier forces0 After 
the Allied landing in southern France on August 15? 1944? 
further partial mobilization was ordered„ Advance guards 
of American forces reached the Swiss on August 2$, allow­
ing Switzerland to resume contact with the outside world0
With the exception of the British Isles, Spain, 
Portugal and Sweden, Switzerland was the only European 
state to maintain its independence during the warQ For 
three basic reasons, Germany failed to incorporate Switzer­
land into the Third Reicho
First of all, Nazism failed to gain a foothold in 
Switzerland as it had in Austria and In the Sudetenlando 
Switzerland’s initial fear of German designs on Swiss ter­
ritory prevented the growth of a substantial Nazi movement 
among the Swiss» The Swiss, in general, were not interested
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in seeing their independent state merged with a "Greater 
Germany,” and Nazi racism failed to make converts„ Thus, 
conditions failed to materialize for a bloodless conquest.
Secondly, during the course of the war, Hitler and 
his advisers were continually absorbed with problems more 
militarily and economically significant than an operation 
against the Swiss. France, Great Britain, the Balkans 
and Russia were immeasurably more important to the Reich 
than was Switzerland. In essence, Switzerland’s position 
on Hitler’s agenda came after the completion of the campaign 
against Russia.
Thirdly, the occupation of Switzerland carried with 
it certain risks. The destruction of the Gotthard and 
Simplon tunnels by the Swiss in the event of a German inva­
sion was a possibility that the High Command could not com­
pletely rule out. If this were accomplished, the German 
venture would yield no positive gains. The Swiss Army, 
although relatively small, would have offered determined 
resistance before withdrawing into the "National Redoubt.”
In the event that the Swiss could carry out an organized 
withdrawal into the "Redoubt,” Germany would be faced with 
a long and costly campaign.
For these reasons, Hitler was content to allow the 
Swiss to continue their independent existence in the heart 
of Nazi dominated Europe. From time to time, political 
and military pressure was applied to prevent a possible
9S
Swiss deviation toward the Allies, while economic concessions 
were extracted to aid the Reich’s war effort„ Rumors of an 
imminent invasion and threats of a preventive occupation, 
which were circulated throughout the war, were utilized to 
achieve psychological and economic goals„ Germany, in 
essence had no immediate intention to invade Switzerland 
until completion of the war with Russia.
CHAPTER IV
SWITZERLAND AND NAZI WAR ECONOMY, 193&-1945
Germany and Switzerland, both highly industrialized 
states, had a long tradition of close economic cooperation^, 
Switzerland, however, being a landlocked state and poorly 
supplied with native raw materials, depended heavily on 
imports to maintain its existence0 Major deficiencies ex­
isted in its supply of coal and iron as well as in textiles 
and fertilizers» In general, Swiss prosperity depended 
upon the state’s position as an "international workshop," 
while imports provided a considerable proportion of food 
stuffs and raw materials0 Payment for such imports was 
met by the export of high-quality manufactured goods» In 
addition,, Switzerland was an important banking and financial 
center which derived considerable income from its tourist 
trade and the trade in luxury items„ Only twenty per cent 
of the 2,000,000 Swiss following a trade or profession were 
engaged in agriculture, and the income of agricultural 
workers amounted to only nine per cent of the total national 
incomeo On the other hand, fifty-two per cent of the people 
were engaged in industry, trade, commerce and banking
*|Arnold Toynbee and Veronica Toynbee (ed0), Survey oi 
International Affairs, 1939-1946s The War and the Neutrals 
(London, 1956), 203-204.
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Swiss prosperity and the state’s high standard of living 
depended on Switzerland’s ability to maintain a high level 
of foreign trade,,
Traditionally, Germany had been among the major 
suppliers of raw material to Switzerland as well as one 
of its most important customers„ By 1 9 3 the Reich was 
both the greatest supplier of raw material to Switzerland 
and the state’s best customer. France, Italy and Great 
Britain followed Germany as the major European exporters 
to Switzerland„ After Germany, Great Britain had been the 
largest importer of Swiss goods before the war„2
Although Switzerland had declined to a mere object 
of the Great Powers in world politics, that object became 
of great importance in wartime because of its peculiar 
situation in military strategy„ The most important trans­
portation route between the north and south of central 
Europe, the Gotthard Tunnel, lay in the territory of the 
Swiss stateo One of the most important routes between 
east and west, which had often served as a convenient 
transit route in the past, also crossed Switzerland,,
These factors gave Switzerland a controlling key position 
in the central Alpine r e g i o n „ 3  The Gotthard line (Essen-
2W 0N„ Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, I (London, 
1952), 223 o /Hereafter cited as Medlicott, Economic 
BloekadeT/
3
J Bon jour, Swiss Neutrality, 102-103«
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Basle-Milan) represented the most efficient connection be­
tween Germany and Italy and proved to be a major asset to 
Swiss bargaining power in negotiations with Germany,,
Economically, Switzerland's position was potentially 
more vulnerable than its military position, since the state 
was bounded on the north and south by Axis powers„ The 
Anschluss of 193$ left Switzerland enclosed on three sides 
by Axis territory and led the Swiss to take measures for 
defense of the country as well as to undertake preliminary 
preparations for establishing a wartime economy„ On April 1, 
193$, the Federal Council enacted a law designed to "safe­
guard the country's supply of goods of vital necessity 
o o o in the event of economic isolation or of war
In September of the same year, the Swiss Minister 
to Berlin initiated efforts to secure from Germany a declara­
tion in principle that the Reich would maintain a supply 
of essential material to Switzerland in time of war* Similar 
requests were made in Paris and Rome0 Negotiations were 
carried on until June 1939, when it was agreed that both 
sides would maintain freight traffic "so far as possible" 
in the event of war0 Further negotiations were undertaken 
to consider to what extent the mutual exchange of goods 
could be maintained,,5
^Toynbee, War and the Neutrals, 204o
5dgfp, d, v, 693 o
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By 193 B, it was obvious to Germany, as well as to 
Great Britain and France, that in the event of a major 
war many of.Switzerlandfs traditional sources of income, 
particularly the tourist trade and the luxury trade, would 
be hard hit and that the Swiss would have to place greater 
reliance on their export of products which served the war 
needs of the belligerents„ Both sides needed Swiss manu­
factures of war material, technical instruments and machines0 
Swiss economic policy after the Anschluss was in­
fluenced not only by Germany but was subject to intense 
pressure from Great Britain as wello Swiss concessions 
to the Reich carried the danger of British economic retalia­
tion, particularly extension of the blockade to include 
Switzerland after the war began„ On the other hand, con­
cessions to Great Britain involved the danger of German 
occupation of Switzerland. The danger from Germany repre­
sented the greatest threat, and the Swiss tended to align 
themselves closer to the Reich as Europe moved toward war0 
In an attempt to restrict Swiss exports to Germany, 
Great Britain proposed in November 193& that Switzerland 
undertake not to export to Germany specific products pro­
duced from raw materials which were imported and to limit 
exports of commodities produced in Switzerland from domestic 
resources0 Britain, in turn, was prepared to take from 
Switzerland guaranteed quantities of certain commodities0 
In addition, the Swiss were invited to restrict theif
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imports from all sources to global figures corresponding to 
their imports over the past three years, less any exports 
to Germany, and to furnish guarantees that none of the 
goods admitted would be re-exported to Germany,, The pro­
posals were considered in Berne, but no further action was 
taken until after the beginning of the war ,,6
In the meantime, German-Swiss negotiations for a 
war-trade agreement were initiated, and on October 24, 1939 
an agreement was concluded„ By its terms, Swiss exports 
to Germany were to be limited to approximately half of the 
value of Swiss imports from Germany0 The balance of the 
German exports to Switzerland were to be devoted to repay­
ment of Germany?s debt to Switzerland. Swiss exports to 
Germany, according to the agreement, were not to be in­
creased but were to be maintained at the stipulated level, 
which approximated the normal peacetime level» The Swiss 
assumed that Germany would be unable to maintain its ex­
ports to Switzerland, and the consequence by the terms of 
the agreement would be a proportionate diminuation of Swiss 
exports to Germany»7 The Swiss were particularly anxious 
to maintain their economy by exporting manufactured products 
to Germany, even though such products might contain raw 
materials from other countries. The Swiss Government,
^Hedlicott, Economic Blockade, I, 224»
7Ibido, 225-26o
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however, assured Britain that such exports would be res­
tricted to goods, the value of which was determined to a 
large degree by the Swiss labor put into them*,^
Because of Italian neutrality and friendship in 
the early months of the war, the Swiss were able to import 
large quantities of goods to increase their reserve stocks0 
While the first months of the war were marked by a large 
decrease in foreign trade, there was a rapid rise in the 
following months, particularly of imports, which exceeded 
those of normal years in both value and w e i g h t D u r i n g  
the "phoney war,” the Swiss experienced little difficulty 
with the Reich, which adopted a generous export policy 
toward Switzerland„ Until the collapse of France, Germany 
was content to adapt to the changing economic situation 
by minor alterations of the German-Swiss Transfer and 
Payments Agreement which was due to expire on June 30,
194Go
During the first six months of the war, Switzerland 
found itself under pressure, not from Germany, but from 
Great Britain, which threatened to include Switzerland in • 
its blockade of German-occupied Europe <> After several 
months of negotiations, an Anglo-French-Swiss war-trade 
agreement was reached on April 25, 1940 which lightened
^Medlicott, Economic Blockade, I, 226 <>
^Toynbee, War and the Neutrals, 209»
to some extent the effects of the blockade on Swiss exports 
and imports. In essence, the agreement stipulated that 
certain classes of goods could be re-exported to the enemy 
or to neutral countries under specified conditions. How­
ever, goods comprising valuable raw materials were allowed 
through contraband controls only upon production of "certi­
ficates of guarantee," which guaranteed that such goods 
would not be re-exported,-^ Allied policy toward Switzer­
land was to allow carefully regulated imports through the 
blockade as long as the Swiss Government seemed able and 
willing to strive for some degree of independence of Axis 
control, Switzerland merely had to guarantee that the 
goods would not be exported in the same condition as that 
in which they were imported, Quantative restrictions were 
not imposed, and the Swiss were free to export to the 
enemy,- to the Allies and to other neutrals, 3̂-
In late April 1940, Germany and Switzerland began 
preliminary negotiations for a new transfer and payments 
agreement. Since the old agreement was due to expire at 
the end of June, Germany made the following demands in 
advance as a pre-requisite for an extension of the clearing 
agreement;
1, Transfer of all assets in special accounts in cash 
foreign exchange to Berlin,
•^Toynbee, War and the .Neutrals, 209,
•^-Medlicott, Economic Blockade« II, 207,
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20 Free choice of purchases drawn on the clearing 
balanceo
3 o Treatment on a footing of real equality with enemy 
states as regards deliveries of war material, 0 <> □
4* Transfer to us /Germany/ of current Dutch, Belgian 
and Norwegian orders of war materials, or the raw 
materials and production facilities earmarked forthat purpose,12
The Swiss accepted only demand one, and three weeks 
later Germany stopped its coal exports to Switzerland,
Upon resumption of the talks in Berne on June 15 > 1940, 
the Swiss agreed to demands three and four and by decree 
carried out an absolute embargo for war material and trans­
ferred twenty-eight million francs to the Reichsbank, even 
without restoration of the coal exports by Germany,13
Germany viewed Switzerland as na huge armaments 
plant which was working almost exclusively for Britain and 
Franceo”!^ Consequently, the German negotiators took the 
stand that, under the ’’changed circumstances,” lifting of 
the coal embargo would be possible only if i
1, The entire former deliveries of aluminum to England 
from Switzerland (i0e0, 12,000 tons of raw aluminum 
plus $^500 tons of aluminum alloys) are absolutely 
delivered to Germany in the futurej
2 0 watch mechanisms, watch jewels, and industrial
diamonds are opened to export in the future without 
restriction °9
3 ° the unimpeded export of raw materials needed for the 
active finishing (conversion) process is opened at 
once j
4° considerable additional orders for machine tools 
12DGFP, D, X, 175o
*3Ibido, 175-76.
14Ibid0. D, IX, 446-47o
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and war material can be placed at once on a short­
term basis and the necessary nonferrous metals for 
this are contributed from Swiss stocks;
5» these orders and in addition considerable deliver­
ies of food stuffs are carried out through the 
coal-iron account and the agricultural account 
on the basis of a credit in the amount of a total 
of 120 million Swiss f r a n c s »
Finding themselves almost completely surrounded 
by the Axis Powers and fearing a possible invasion of their 
own countryj the Swiss delegates were forced to make conces- 
sions--but on the condition that the coal embargo be lifted 
and necessary deliveries be assured0 In regard to the first 
demand, Germany received from Switzerland all the aluminum 
formerly delivered to Great Britain on the condition that 
Germany assure delivery to Switzerland of the necessary 
aluminum oxide from Italy, France and Germany„ The Swiss 
accepted demands two and three without reservation.. By 
demand four, additional ordering of machine tools and war 
material was agreed upon up to the limits of the actual 
capacity of the Swiss factories0 In regard to the fifth 
demand, the Swiss promised to make available a credit for 
payment of the additional articles of demand four and for 
agricultural products in the amount of coal deliveries actu­
ally made0 This meant that for every ton of coal delivered 
Germany received deliveries of the same value in return and 
an equivalent once again as credit for payment of the addi­
tional orders of war materialo-^
15DGFP, D, X, 175-760 
l6Ibi.d, . 176 o
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Field Marshal Goering, whose Luftwaffe had suffered 
several losses over Switzerland, emphasized his general 
dissatisfaction with the attitude of the Swiss during the 
negotiationso He suggested that the Swiss be handled 
"very toughly" and demanded during a discussion at Karin- 
hall that Switzerland must be denied coal until the ninety 
Messerschmidt airplanes delivered to Switzerland in 1939 
and 1940 were returned to Germany0 However, the German 
negotiators impressed the Field Marshall with the hard 
line already taken in regard to Switzerland and expressed 
doubt that the planes could be returned o-*-?
By July 9S 1940, the German delegates were satis­
fied with the course of the negotiations and notified Ber­
lin that it was possible that the amount of credit as mea­
sured against the coal deliveries actually made might be 
further increased and possibly doubled0 The head of the 
German delegation, Dr„ Hans Hemmen,-*-^ cautioned that the 
Reich should not attempt demands beyond that and should 
not make the return of the Messerschmidts a prerequisite 
for lifting the coal embargo o-̂-9
The new Transfer and Payments Agreement was signed
17d g f p s C, X, 110o
1 gDr0 Hans hemmen; Chairman of the Special Commis­
sion on economic questions with the German Armistice Com=- 
mission0
19DGFP» D, x, 1760
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on August 9? 1940o Its most significant result was the 
alteration of Swiss imports against Swiss exports to Ger­
many 5 which comprised seventy-five per cent of German 
payments to Switzerland„ Germany undertook to deliver coal 
to the same extent as in 1939s & favorable yearD Swit­
zerland agreed to supplement the agricultural and industrial 
exports and, in order to prevent delays in delivery to 
Germany, made advances to Swiss exporters» Exports of 
weapons to Britain ceased , and there was a corresponding 
increase in such supplies to Germany and Italyo The value 
of the latter in Swiss francs was estimated at 33 million 
to Germany and 34 million to Italy in 1940 and 122 million 
to Germany and 6.1 million to Italy in 1941
Germany took advantage of the negotiations to intro­
duce a counter-blockade against Great Britain0 For some 
times, Germany had overlooked the Swiss export of goods by 
rail through unoccupied France0 Goods for Britain and the 
United States were freely consigned by this route via Spain 
to Portugalo Various transit arrangements in August 1940 
put an end to this route„ On August 29, Germany issued an 
ordinance stating that, as of.September 1, 1940, certain 
commodities named in the German tariff had to have transit 
permits (Geleitscheine) issued by the legation in Berne 
for transit in Germany and German-occupied territory;
^^Medlicott, Economic Blockade, I, 5$£0
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similar instructions were issued to Italian customs0 Pre­
viously , the French Government had agreed that transit via 
both occupied and unoccupied France should be subject to 
license and to German export control, The effect of these 
regulations was to give the German legation in Berne a 
rigid, control over Swiss exports to all destinations0 A 
comprehensive list was drawn up defining war materials, and 
such goods could not be exported at all0 A further list com­
prised goods requiring the Geleitschein; all goods and raw 
material of war potential fell within this listc Finally, 
there was a provision whereby the residue of Swiss exports;, 
not covered by any of the lists, could be exported in "nor­
mal quantities" based on the years 1937 and 193$« Transit
permits were necessary for approximately sixty per cent of
21Swiss exports to Britain„
Germany continued to strengthen its control over 
Switzerland by other measures» By September 1940, an 
increased amount of Swiss letter post was routed through 
Germany via Stuttgart„ Germany also exerted influence 
on Swiss trading and financial arrangements with occupied 
and satellite states„ Between August 28 and September 20 „ 
1940, negotiations in Berne led to new arrangements af­
fecting traffic and payments to Bohemia, Moravia, Norway, 
Holland and Belgium,, Trading and financial relations
2 1Medlicott, Economic Blockade„ I, 5$$°
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with Poland were regulated by a provisional agreement arrang­
ing for transactions to be carried out on a compensation 
basis o From January 1, 1-941, trade with territories incor­
porated in the Reich were settled through the German-Swiss
clearing, a special account being created for former Polish 
22territoryo
The Anglo-French-Swiss war trade agreement of 1940 
still remained, although the French had withdrawn and the 
remaining two governments recognized that few of its pro- 
visions were still applicable0 German economic dominance 
of Swiss trade caused concern in London, where an extension 
of the economic blockade to include Switzerland was con­
sidered „ However, in the Ministry of Economic Warfare there 
still existed considerable support for the view that as 
long as the Swiss Government struggled to preserve some 
degree of independence Britain should offer the encourage­
ment of only carefully regulating exports to Switzerland0 
The British were understandably reluctant to allow the 
Swiss to import through Axis-controlled territory, goods 
which might be taken by the Axis Powers0 They also feared 
that the Germans might bring pressure on the Swiss to dis­
gorge goods imported for their own use0 After prolonged 
discussion, an agreement was reached on October 15, 1940 
under which Britain agreed to relax the blockade in order
^Medlicott, Economic Blockade, I, 5$9°
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to allow Switzerland to import certain essential commodi­
ties when its existing stocks did not exceed two months? 
supply0 This concession was to be cancelled if it became 
evident that the Swiss had been obliged to give way to 
German pressure for the re-export of imported goods3 or 
if the goods were retained by the Italian or Vichy govern­
ments on the way0 Britain also agreed to release some 
more of the ships which had been chartered by the Swiss 
and which had been detained by the British after the fall 
of F r a n c e ip was agreed that on political grounds 
there were major advantages to be gained if the risk of 
continuing imports were taken0 The possibility of obtain­
ing from Switzerland much-needed goods of small bulk—  
precision instruments s watches, fuse mechanisms— still 
existedj but such exports depended on the good will of 
Swiss authorities which might be lost if the blockade 
were enforced 0 Furthermore9 Switzerland served as a clear­
ing house for prisoners of war8 and it would be an inconven­
ience not to have Switzerland in charge of German interests0 
Finally, information on Germany from the British legation 
in Berne was of great importance for war purposes„ Hence, 
economic contacts with Switzerland were accepted for the 
time beingo Great Britain felt that is was ?,a little 
unfair to the Swiss to class them with Vichy— a discredited
^Toynbee, War and the Neutrals, 217-1$°
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clique 0n2^
Switzerland's policy was based on the belief that 
neutrality could be maintained throughout the course of 
the war, and accordingly it sought to strengthen its one 
great bargaining counter; control of the Gotthard Tunnel 
which had become the life-line of the German-Italian war 
effort*^ Italian industry imported practically all of 
its coal from Germany0 Since early 1940, when the British 
put an end to shipment of German coal to Italy by water 
(down the Rhine to Rotterdam and then around Spain to 
Genoa}, the coal needed to operate Italian industries—  
one million tons per month-had to be transported by lando 
The Gotthard line, which rah from Basle on the German- 
Swiss frontier to Chiasso on the Italian-Swiss frontier,, 
provided the most direct route. In addition to coal, 
Germany supplied Italy with other important raw materials, 
including iron, steel, wood and base m e t a l s T h e  Gott­
hard route was not used for the transport of German forces 
to Italyo When necessary, the Reich utilized the Brenner 
Pass route to transport additional forces to Italy0
As previously mentioned, new Swiss military plans 
were drawn up which provided for withdrawal of the army
^Medlicott, Economic Blockade, I, 590o 
25Ibid., II, 207.
EoS„ Hediger, "Switzerland in W a r t i m e Foreign 
Policy Reports„ XVIII (1943)i 2630
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into the central masiff, or "National Redoubt in the 
event of an invasion0 The army was maintained on a war 
footings, defense works undertaken, and Germany left with 
no doubt that the destruction of the tunnels would be 
certain in the event of an invasion„
Great Britain hoped to encourage Switzerland's 
will to resist German pressure by adapting the economic 
blockade to Switzerland's peculiar positions, but by April 
1941 it was obvious that the Swiss were drifting more and 
more under Axis influence„ The fact that the Swiss economic 
machine was largely at the disposal of the Axis was endorsed 
when Swiss authorities announced, under German pressure, that 
unrestricted exports of goods in two-kilogram packets were 
prohibited , further reducing the flow of Swiss exports 
to the outside world0^7 In June and July, there followed 
a series of new economic agreements with Germany, Italy 
and the satellite states0 Between July 6 and July 1 49 
exchange problems between Switzerland and Slovakia were 
ironed out , and a regular commercial treaty with a mutual 
agreement to increase trade as much as- possible followed„
On July 11, the Swiss press announced the conclusion of 
arrangements to improve the transport of goods from Rumania, 
Bulgaria and other countries in the Near and Middle East 
through Germany to Switzerland„ The major discussions
^Medlicott, Economic Blockade „ II, 20S~2Q9o
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were concluded after eight months of negotiations by the 
signing of a German-Swiss trade agreement on July IS, 1941°
By the terms of the agreement, which was to last up 
to the end of 1942, Germany agreed to deliver 200,000 tons 
of coal per month to Switzerland0 The amount before June 1# 
was 150,000 tons per month0 Negotiations over iron ore 
had caused a great deal of difficulty and Germany finally 
agreed to deliver 13,500 tons per month of iron and steel 
without imposing conditions as to its use0 This amount 
did not include the 5,000 to 6,000 tons of iron and non- 
ferrous metals which Germany supplied to Switzerland for 
the manufacture of goods ordered for German use. Copper 
and other metals for such manufactures were also to be 
suppliedo The Reich agreed, in addition, to supply each 
month 14,500 tons of petroleum products, including petrol 
14,650 tons), fuel oil (1,000 tons for industrial use 
only), diesel engine oil (1,000 tons) and lubricating oil 
(1,200 tons). These products were to be delivered prin­
cipally from Rumanian stocks, but if Rumanian supplies were 
not forthcoming Germany promised to keep up the supply from 
its own stockso Payments were to be made through the Swiss- 
Rumanian clearing. As in the past, Switzerland was to send 
its own tank wagons to fetch the oil0 The remaining German 
exports to Switzerland consisted of sugar (5,000 hectoliters), 
seeds (4,000 tons, the usual amount), potato seeds (200,000 
quintals), oats (20,000 quintals), barley (20,000 quintals)
116
and fertilizers (250 s,000 quintals K 2$
Switzerlands in return, agreed to continue exports 
of certain agricultural produce and manufactured goods to 
Germany and to grant Germany advances on the clearing agree­
ment o Such advances were not to exceed 450 million Swiss 
francs at the end of 1941s, 650 million by June 30, 1942, 
and $50 million by December 31» 1942» The Swiss advances 
were subject to Germany?s supplying the raw material required 
for goods to be manufactured, to the export capacity of the 
country, and to the import of goods produced in Switzerland„ 
Repayment, of the outstanding amounts by deliveries of coal 
and iron by Germany after 1941 was foreseen,,29
When informing Britain of the agreements the Swiss 
estimated that twenty per cent of their exports were con­
trolled by Germany and Italy by ‘Geleltscheine„ Of the re­
maining eighty per cent, ten per cent was on the "free 
list," while the Swiss controlled the rest on the basis 
of normal exports in 1937-193$°3® Concessions to Great 
Britain by Switzerland in the form of increased export 
quotas amounted to only 100 million francs and were found 
to be of little practical value031 Britain consequently
2%5edlicott, Economic Blockade, II, 209-2100 
29Ibido, 210-11„
3°Ibido, 212o
31Ibido » 211o
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decided to withdraw facilities for practically all Swiss 
imports with the exception of foodstuffs, fodders and oil 
and fats for soap-making. In essence;, Britain refused to 
allow any further imports of raw material by Switzerland 
which could benefit the Axis countries0 In short, British, 
and later Anglo-American efforts, to secure restrictions of 
Swiss exports in this period failed
British proposals to sever economic connections with 
Switzerland and to include the Swiss in the blockade of the 
Axis countries were frequently considered but always post­
poned In. addition to reasons previously considered , it 
became more important to avoid pushing the Swiss into a 
diplomatic rupture, or worse, with Germany, since Switzer­
land had undertaken the diplomatic representation of Bri­
tish and American interests in enemy countries0 Switzer­
land ys situation negated Allied attempts to obtain real 
concessions throughout 1942 and the first half of 1943° 
Negotiations to reach an agreement proceeded throughout'
1942, but it gradually became evident that the Swiss were 
not prepared to risk offending Germany0
The Swiss Government did not feel compelled to 
change Its policy markedly In the Allies1' favor, even after 
the Allied landings in North Africa The British soon 
realized that it was not merely concern for neutrality,
^Medlicott, Economic Blockade, II, 2120
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nor even a healthy fear of German retaliations, which deter­
mined Swiss policyo Although these circumstances were 
certainly important? they were additional to the influence 
of Swiss manufacturers who were conducting a highly profit­
able wartime trade with Germany*33 The situation at the 
end of 1942 found Switzerland and the Allies prepared to 
agree on a "compensation deal/’ whereby goods would be 
exchanged between Switzerland ? Britain and the United 
States to the value of 2^ million francs» An agreement 
along these lines was signed on December 14? 1942? but it 
was subject to Germany5s consent on the one hand and on 
the other to Swiss acceptance of a formidable Allied demand 
for progressive reduction of Swiss exports of arms and 
machinery to Germany0 Neither condition could be secured03^
Germany made its adherence to the "compensation 
deal” conditional on the conclusion of a new German-Swiss 
trade agreement but as an interim measure agreed to a re­
duction in the amount of Swiss goods sent to Germany* When 
German-Swiss negotiations were suspended on January 15? 1943? 
the Swiss Government suspended the credit facilities granted 
to Germany in 1941 and discontinued its guarantee of Swiss 
exports to the Reich* In the meantime? trade continued 
on a "hand-to-mouth" basis with a considerable decrease
33Toynbee? War and the Neutrals ? 77“7$0
34Ibido, 780
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in Swiss exports to Germany0̂ 5 
»
By January 1943 > Germany was already behind in its 
coal deliveries to Switzerland, as defined in the 1941 
agreemento Germany now demanded that Swiss exports to the 
Axis countries of raw materials and machinery for the dura­
tion of the new agreement be maintained at not less than 
their previous levels, although Switzerland would be com­
pelled to go short of products for its own economic and 
defense needs0 Further demands included restoration of 
Swiss exports of agricultural and dairy products to the 
early 1942 level and reduction of Swiss exports of machines 
and machine tools to neutral countries such as Spain, which 
had recently placed large o r d e r s T h e  Swiss were prepared 
to finance orders to the extent of the balance remaining 
out of the 1941 agreement, but refused to agree to fresh 
financing of exports to Germany on the same lines0
Although the Germans used the threat of a ,Tpreven­
tive occupation” of Switzerland as a means of economic 
pressure in March 1943» it was not likely that the Reich 
would attempt an occupation*, Effective reprisals could be 
applied by reducing or cutting off Swiss supplieso Even 
this measure was not necessarily in Germanyvs interest, 
since it meant corresponding loss of Swiss exports0 It
^^Toynbee, War and the Neutrals9 ?B0 
-^Medlicott, Economic Blockade, II, 499“$00»
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appeared to the Allies that Switzerland- was not doing 
enough to secure from Germany the maximum limit of conces­
sions „ On the contrary, there seemed good reason to believe 
that Switzerland was seeking the maximum limit of Allied 
concessions in the interest of its exporting industries
The American Minister to Berne cabled Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull on April 9, 1943 that the Swiss were 
about to conclude a new trade agreement with Germany but 
that the Swiss officials had assured him that everything 
possible was being done to bring about a satisfactory 
reduction in what the Allies considered to be undesirable 
exports to the Axis.. Hull, in reply, ordered Leland Har­
rison, the American Minister in Berne, to make clear to 
the Swiss that, !! pending clarification of Switzerland's 
position, we would suspend, with certain exceptions, all 
export licenses and navicerts covering Swiss imports <>"3$
However, the Swiss Government, influenced by Swiss 
industrialists and the fear of the political consequences 
of unemployment resulting from the fall of Swiss imports 
to Germany, more than by serious belief in German invasion, 
virtually surrendered to German demands in April 1943» 
Germany undertook to supply the arrears of coal and iron 
outstanding under the 1941 agreement, leaving the Swiss
^Medlicott„-Economic Blockade, II, 49$.
^^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II 
(LIoj 194$), 1349o /Hereafter cited as Hull, Memoirs.7
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Government with no choice but to restore its guarantee 
on all orders placed by Germany0 Moreover, the Swiss had 
been surprised to discover that there were still about 
350,000,000 francs’ worth of former credit outstanding; 
the whole of it was taken up by orders placed in early 
January 1943 > indicating that there would be a substantial 
increase in Swiss deliveries to Germany in the next months0 
During the previous three months German coal deliveries 
had been one-third less than the agreed 150,000 tons per 
month. Total arrears under the old agreement were roughly 
950,000 tonso Germany proposed to liquidate the balance 
over a four month period, while Switzerland continued to 
execute the orders covered by the credit balance, Ger­
many was to be given further credit facilities based on 
the extent to which coal deliveries exceeded 150,000 tons 
per month, and delivery of an additional 1,£00,000 tons 
of coal and coke products was visualized over a period of
a year,39
The Swiss concessions amounted to a reversal of the 
trend of February and March 1943 when Swiss exports to 
Germany declined. The agreement reached between Germany 
and Switzerland reduced by twenty per cent some of the 
headings in which the Allies were interested but did not 
rule out the granting of further credit facilities to
^^Medlicott, Economic Blockade, II, 500-501o
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Germany based on coal deliveries. ^  The Allies, therefore, 
placed a temporary embargo on the issuance of navicerts 
and export licenses for Switzerland,
The June 1943 agreement represented the last time 
that Germany was able to impose its will on Switzerland 
economically. Militarily the tide had turned against the 
Axis with the loss of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, the 
Allied landing in North Africa and the subsequent defeat 
of Rommel's forces. As defeat of the Axis became increas­
ingly apparent in 1943 > the Allied position in economic 
negotiations increased correspondingly.
The most potent Allied weapon was the black list, 
the significance of which at this stage of the war was the 
fear it created of ostracism from post-war markets. Among 
the Swiss there developed a corresponding tendency to adopt 
a bolder line toward Germany, partially through decreased 
fear of German retaliation and partly through the desire to 
avoid the bad debts of a defeated customer.
In discussions with Swiss delegates in London, the 
Allies abandoned their earlier understanding policy, British 
and American pressure induced one Swiss firm after another 
to restrict trade.with Germany, What the earlier embargo 
had failed to achieve was quickly granted before the end 
of 1943» As early as June 1943, a group of Swiss firms
^Toynbee, War and the Neutrals, 7$“79°
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agreed to limit their exports of fuses to Germany by twenty 
five per cent in return for removal from the black list.^1
The Allied-Swiss negotiations resulted in the 
signature of an agreement in London on December 19, 1943 
whereby the Swiss agreed to reduce exports of arras, ammu­
nition and machinery to the Axis by forty-five per cento 
The export of the most strategic manufactures, such as 
ball bearings, fuses and precision tools, was even more 
drastically reduced— sixty per cent below the 1942 level. 
The Swiss further agreed to prevent•concentration of these 
exports in the early months of 1944, to send no such ex­
ports to Italy, to reduce exports proportionally whenever 
any part of Axis territory was liberated, and to make no 
credit commitments to the Axis without first consulting 
the Allies, In return, the Allies restored the food and 
fodder export quotas to Switzerland as they existed in 
April 1943 but coupled their restoration with a probition 
against the export of dairy products.^
Following the Normandy invasion and the landing 
in southern France, the British and Americans made new 
demands on the Swiss on September IS, 1944.. In return for 
immediate and long-term concessions, the Swiss were asked 
to embargo all exports to Germany of certain specified
^Toynbee, War and the Neutrals, 79.
^Hull, Memoirs, 1349-50,
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strategic commodities and to reduce to a prewar level the 
transit traffic between Germany and -Italy. On October 1, 
Switzerland prohibited the export of arms, ammunition, 
explosives, airplanes and parts and bearings
At the end of October, the Simplon, but not the 
Gotthard route, was closed to transit traffic. Germany 
no longer represented the major concern for the Swiss, 
and they concentrated their efforts on future relations 
with Allies. In January 1945, an Allied delegation met 
in Berne, and in April all its requirements were met. 
Carriage of coal iron, scrap iron and steel from Germany 
to Italy was prohibited. Other traffic was reduced to 
nominal amounts, total Swiss exports to Germany reduced 
to token figures and the Swiss supply of electricity to 
Germany cut off.^
The Swiss Government further agreed to prevent the 
use of Swiss territory for the disposal, concealment, or 
reception of assets illegally taken during the war. A 
Swiss decree had already blocked German funds, and the 
Government undertook to purchase no more gold from Germany 
except that needed for diplomatic expenses. In return, 
the Allies announced that there was no longer any blockade 
reason for limiting Swiss imports.
^Hull, Memoirs» 1349-50.
^Toynbee, War and the Neutrals. Si.
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Germany’s economic policy toward Switzerland during 
the war was directed to attain two objectives„ First of 
all, the Reich intended to assume most, if not all, of 
Switzerland’s exports which it needed„ And second, it was 
equally urgent that the Reich prevent, as far as possible. 
Allied import of Swiss materials of war potential„ From 
1939 to 1943? because of British hesitation to extend the 
blockade to include the Swiss, Germany continually increased 
its imports from Switzerland and at the same time secured 
a large credit on which to make further purchases0 German 
control of coal, upon which the Swiss were dependent, pro­
vided the Reich with a major bargaining advantage,, If the 
embargo on coal failed to produce the desired results, 
there remained the threat of German occupation of Switzer­
land o The embargo of 1941 led to a highly satisfactory 
agreement for Germany, and the threat of a "preventive 
occupation" in 1943 undoubtedly influenced Swiss exporters 
enough to produce another satisfactory agreement even though 
the Reich had failed to maintain its supply of coal to the 
Swisso
After the fall of France, the German occupation 
of Switzerland appears to have been feared to a greater 
extent in London than in Berne„ Until 1943» the Ministry 
of Economic Warfare hesitated to take any action that
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might force Switzerland into a conflict with the Reich and 
a possible occupation of that state. In Switzerland, the 
fear of occupation subsided considerably after the Franco- 
German Armistice and to a large extent disappeared after 
the beginning of the attack on Russia. In essence, the 
Swiss industrialists and exporters carried on a highly prof­
itable war trade with Nazi Germany, just as they had done 
with Imperial Germany during the first World War. Thus by 
1943 s Germany obtained extensive Swiss materials while 
successfully limiting the Allied imports from Switzerland.
However, 1943 proved to be the turning point in the 
contest for Swiss exports. The Allied victories induced 
them to adopt a new policy toward the Swiss. Use of the 
black list achieved immediate results with the Swiss ex­
porters who were now willing to decrease exports to Germany 
in return for removal from the list. Germany by late 1943 
was in no position to make reprisals, and Swiss exports 
to the Reich continued to decrease throughout 1943 s 1944 
and 1945* By the end of the war, the Swiss found themselves 
aligned closely to the Allies, in almost complete opposi­
tion to their policy six years earlier..
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
With the accession to power of the National Social­
ist Party in January 1933? Germany initiated its efforts 
to bring about the incorporation of all Germans in a ’’great 
German Reicha” The Nazi press and party members in foreign 
countries played upon the frustration and resentment of 
Germans living under foreign governments„ Such propaganda 
and agitation was particularly successful in Austria, a 
predominantly German state favoring union with Germany, 
and among the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia who were 
allegedly oppressed by the Czech government„ The doctrine 
of ’’self-determination of peoples” gained wide'support 
in both countries and provided some justification for 
Hitler!,s concept of a ’’greater Germany,,”
In Switzerland, however, the opposite occurred«, 
Although the Swiss were predominantly German, Nazi racist 
propaganda and agitation met with strong resistance„ Un­
like Austria and Czechoslovakia, Switzerland contained no 
mass of discontented Germans to whom National Socialism 
could appealo In addition to the German-speaking Swiss, 
the state contained substantial French and Italian minor­
ities, but under its federal form of government the Swiss
12?
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had found the answer to the difficulties arising from the 
conclusion of three separate nationalities within its 
borderso In essence, the de-emphasis of race held the 
state together and produced a Swiss nationalism which 
replaced separate German, French and Italian nationalism. 
National Socialism, with its emphasis on the union of all 
Germans represented a threat to Swiss independence , which 
the Swiss, particularly the German Swiss, had fought to 
preserve since the thirteenth century„ For this reason.
The Swiss were not anxious to see National Socialism gain 
a foothold in Switzerland„ The threat of Nazi Germany dif­
fered little from the threat presented to the Swiss in 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by the Habsburg 
emperorso
Nazi propagandists were unable to differentiate 
between the Germans of Austria and Czechoslovakia and the 
German Swiss0 Their refusal to adapt their propaganda 
to the situation in Switzerland represented a major reason 
for Germany’s failure to incorporate Switzerland into the 
Reicho Even against the continued suggestions from German 
diplomats in Berne, the Nazi press persisted in its emphasis 
on incorporating all Germans in the Reich, while attacking 
Swiss authorities and institutions0 By the outbreak of the 
war, the German press was attacking the Swiss as traitors 
to their own blood0 Consequently, National Socialism made 
few converts in Switzerland„ On the contrary, it led to a
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resurgence of Swiss patriotisms, and the Swiss began to 
take measures to improve the countryfs military forces»
The Fuehrer himself apparently formulated no def­
inite policy toward Switzerland other than the general de­
sire to unite all Germans in the Reich0 Since favorable 
conditions for an Anschluss failed to materialize, Hitler 
contented himself with Switzerland's gradual return to 
absolute, armed neutrality„ By 1 9 3 'the Swiss had been 
released from the responsibility of participating in 
League sanctions and restated their intention to defend 
Swiss neutrality and independence against any aggressor—  
German as well as Frencho Switzerland’s intention to 
defend its frontiers against any aggressor coincided with 
Germany’s military interests;, for it meant that a poten­
tial French attack through Switzerland into southern Ger­
many would be strongly resisted if not prevented0
Hitler’s respect for the concept of neutrality 
played no role in Germany’s failure to incorporate Swit­
zerland o Had circumstances or needs demanded an invasion 
of Switzerland, Hitler would not have been adverse to vio­
lating the country'‘’s neutrality,, During the course of 
the war the position of Switzerland in German strategy 
simply did not justify an attack on that state0 The suc­
cess of the Hitler-Manstein plan against France in 1940 
made consideration of outflanking the Maginot Line through
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Switzerland unnecessary,, Postwar accounts by personalities 
involved in the planning and execution of the operation 
indicate that an attack through Switzerland was not even 
considered„
Following the fall of France, Hitler was deeply 
involved in an attempt to reach a negotiated peace with 
Britain and hesitated to engage in another operation until 
sure of Britain Ss attitude„ By late July 1940, it was 
obvious that Britain intended to continue the war, and 
Hitler accordingly issued the directive for Operation 
Sealion, which was followed in five months by the direc­
tive for the attack on Russia0
Preparations for an attack on Switzerland pro­
ceeded simultaneously throughout the simmer and fall of 
1940, but no date for execution of the operation was ever 
issuedo The High Command stipulated that September was 
the most favorable month for an operation against Swit­
zerland but allowed the planning to continue well into 
October, thus postponing the operation for at least a 
year0 However, by June 1941 Germany had begun its offen­
sive against Russia0 It is unlikely that either Hitler 
or the High Command considered removing forces from the 
Russian front to engage in a relatively unrewarding attack 
on Switzerland0 The initiation of the Russian campaign, 
as much as any other event, prevented a German occupation
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of Switzerlando Hitler undoubtedly intended to come to 
terms with Switzerland after Russia was defeated»
During the first four years of the war9 Germany 
and Switzerland were able to come to terms in regard to 
German wartime economy„ After the fall of France , Ger­
many found in Switzerland a source of material which could 
effectively be channeled into the German war effort0 At 
the same time it was possible to prevent Swiss exports to 
the Allies since Switzerland was almost completely sur­
rounded by Axis territory<, By cutting off its coal supply 
to Switzerland, Germany could secure favorable trade agree­
ments and reduce Swiss exports to Britain0 The Swiss made 
the most of their situation by exporting manufactured goods 
and certain agricultural products to Germany and reaping 
large profits in return., The favorable economic relations 
with the Swiss during the Russian campaign tended to mini- 
mize the necessity of incorporation Switzerland into the 
Reicho
A German invasion of Switzerland between 1940 and 
1943 could offer Germany no advantages which would outweigh 
the possible consequences0 It was well known in Germany 
that the Gotthard and Simplon tunnels would be destroyed 
by the Swiss in the first hours of the attack0 Unless 
this could be prevented, Germany faced the loss of the 
most efficient transportation route to Italy0 In addition,
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the devastation of Swiss industry, or its destruction by 
the Swiss before retreating into the central massif, meant 
the end of Switzerland’s contributions to Germany’s war 
efforto Militarily, the occupation of Switzerland threatened 
to be a long and expensive campaign in the Alps against 
Swiss guerrilla forces„ For these reasons, Germany was 
not anxious to attack Switzerland while engaged in an 
attack on Russia0 The threat of an invasion was usually 
sufficient to obtain economic concessions„
By 1943? the Allies had turned the tide, allowing 
Great Britain to adopt a hard line in economic negotia­
tions with the Swisso The use of the black list proved 
effective in breaking Nazi domination of Swiss exports 
without greatly risking a German invasion of the country 
since Germany’s military position was continually deterior- 
atingc Swiss exports to Germany declined after 1943 as 
an Allied victory became more of a certainty0 By the 
fall of 1944 Germany had lost most of its control over 
Switzerlando The Swiss in turn worked to insure them­
selves a favorable position with the victors„
There is no question that Nazi Germany intended 
to force the Swiss into the Reich sooner or later, but 
a definite decision was never taken0 The most favorable 
method would have been an Anschluss, but National Social­
ism failed to make significant converts among the Swiss0
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Hitler consequently had to be satisfied with Swiss neutral­
ity and economic concessions until an.attack could be un­
dertaken. However, German involvement with France, Britain 
and then Russia prevented serious consideration of an 
occupation of Switzerland until the major enemies were 
disposed of, a task which Germany failed to complete, 
Switzerland, in the meantimes, remained the only indepen­
dent country in central Europe0
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OKH Operations Staff's initial conception of Operation Tannenbaum.
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Operation Tannenbaum as revised by General von Leeb.
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Operation Tannenbaum as revised by General Franz Haider.
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The New York Times represents one of the most 
valuable sources of information on Germany’s relations 
with Switzerland, particularly for the period 1933 to 
1940o Accounts of German violations of Swiss neutrality, 
Swiss protests, Nazi activity in Switzerland and Swiss 
defensive measures were useful in determining Germany’s 
attitude toward Swiss neutrality„ In addition, the 
Times carried important accounts from German and Swiss
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Periodical sources, in general, were valuable 
for contemporary accounts of German activity in Switzer™ 
land. The articles by R.A. Friedman, Ernest Hediger and 
G.E.W„ Johnson provided the best accounts of Switzerland*s 
situation during the Nazi era and German attempts to 
extend National Socialism to Switzerland.
Trevor'-Roper’s short article on Admiral Canaris 
generally disproves the myth of Canaris as the head of 
the German resistance and casts considerable doubt on 
the Admiral’s ability as head of Germany’s military in­
telligence o
H.Jo Morgenthau, R.C. Brooks and Walter Zahler 
discussed Switzerland’s position in the League of Na­
tions and provided additional information on Switzerland’s 
attempt to reconcile neutrality and collective security.
